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EDITOR’S NOTE
N

orth America experienced the largest power outage in
history this past summer. From New York to Detroit,
people gazed into the starry night - unobstructed by
light pollution -wondering what could have caused such a huge
failure. The problem was traced back to a few downed power
lines in Ohio and an overburdened and increasingly
interconnected transmission grid. Almost immediately,
politicians and civic leaders were calling for the heads of those
responsible. Unfortunately, the blame was placed almost
exclusively on the nation’s aging transmission grid rather than
on the nation’s gluttonous over-consumption of power.
With the blackout’s root cause misleadingly diagnosed,
most of the proposed solutions have been extremely limited
and, in some cases, wrongheaded. The Bush Administration
and the electric industry insist that the answer to our energy
woes is increased supply – in this case, spending billions of
dollars of ratepayers’ money upgrading and modernizing the
nation’s power grid. In a mantra that has become all too familiar
from this Administration, no attention is paid to reducing the
rate of consumption as a way of minimizing the stress on our
existing energy infrastructure.
In fact, the Administration has consistently worked to
undermine such efforts, whether by slashing funding for Energy
Star – the program dedicated to increasing appliance efficiency
– or by exempting over 17,000 energy facilities from
compliance with the Clean Air Act. When asked whether
Americans should cut back on energy consumption, Press
Secretary Ari Fleischer summed up the Administration’s position
as follows: “That’s a big no. The president believes that it’s an
American way of life…the American way of life is a blessed
one. And we have a bounty of resources in this country.”
To be sure, we must invest in upgrading our crumbling
infrastructure. But, this is only part of the equation. We must
also begin using and generating energy more wisely through
greater efficiency and conservation and a greater reliance on
renewable sources of energy. Especially important is the use
of decentralized clean power sources like solar cells and wind
turbines that can create power at or close to the point of
consumption, thus avoiding reliance on the transmission grid
altogether.
Before we commit to spending billions of dollars of
ratepayers’ money on merely expanding what we currently
have, we must consider the alternatives. For example, by
adjusting electricity rates according to the level of consumption
– as California utilities began doing during the 2001 energy
crisis – efficiency and conservation is rewarded by way of
lower-than-ordinary rates for the power that is consumed.
Myriad other practical examples exist for reducing energy
demand: from more efficient building design to the use of
power-saving lighting and appliances. As decreased demand
lowers the stress on the existing infrastructure and the money
required for maintaining the grid, more money can be made
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available for tax credits and other incentives for renewable
energy investments. This more sustainable energy path would
not only prevent future catastrophic power failures, but would
also lead to cleaner air, a healthier environment, and the
development of new industries and jobs.

Dave Newman
Editor-in-Chief
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LITIGATION UPDATE
EPA’s Administrative
Compliance Orders Ruled
Unconstitutional
By Mary Margaret McCleroy*
n June 24, 2003, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
declared the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(“EPA”) authority to issue legally binding
administrative compliance orders (“ACOs”) unconstitutional.1
This decision could foreshadow a broader movement to
weaken EPA’s ability to enforce the broad range of
environmental and public health statutes that it is responsible
for implementing. While this decision undermines EPA’s ability
to enforce ACOs, it does not leave EPA completely helpless to
enforce environmental laws.
When the EPA obtains information that an individual,
business, or agency is violating a law, it has four options to
enforce compliance.2 First, the EPA can request the Attorney
General to enforce a criminal prosecution.3 Second, the EPA
can file suit in district court for injunctive relief to temporarily
stop an action (or non-action) until a trial on the merits can be
heard.4 Third, the EPA can adjudicate liability under the
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) and assess civil penalties
against the violators.5 All of these actions are subject to judicial
review and none of them are affected by the Eleventh Circuit’s
ruling.
The EPA’s fourth option is to issue an ACO directing
compliance.6 If the violator continues to ignore the law, then
the EPA may assess fines and penalties against the violator.7
The Eleventh Circuit argues that ACOs are not a final agency
action and are therefore not subject to judicial review.8 A
violation of an ACO is its own violation, leading to fines and
imprisonment.9 The Eleventh Circuit claims that ACOs, which
in themselves have the status of law with their own civil fines
and criminal penalties, are not subject to adjudication about
any EPA violations, they therefore are unconstitutional. 10
Because ACO receivers are not afforded an opportunity to
represent themselves in a neutral tribunal, ACOs violate the
violation of the Due Process Clause of the constitution.11
Furthermore, because ACOs have the status of law and carry
their own fines, civil penalties, and criminal punishment, ACOs
furthermore violate the separation-of-power principal between
the judicial branch and the executive branch in the EPA.12
Whether ACOs are truly unconstitutional is a subject
for debate. In a separate case, the EPA filed a Supreme Court
brief on July 16, 2003, in which the EPA claims that the Eleventh
Circuit’s reasoning for deter mining that ACOs are
unconstitutional was flawed.13 First, the EPA claims that all

O
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EPA orders, including ACOs, are subject to judicial review
either on petition for review or in an action brought by the
EPA to enforce the order in court.14 Secondly, the EPA claims
that the Eleventh Circuit’s understanding of the Due Process
Clause was erroneous; the Due Process Clause does not require
a formal evidentiary hearing in all circumstances.15
The Supreme Court will ultimately decide the constitutionality
of EPA ACOs. However, even without ACOs the EPA still
has three methods of enforcement at its disposal. The EPA
will still be able to initiate criminal prosecutions, injunctive relief,
assessment of liability, and civil penalties. If the Supreme Court
deems that ACOs are unconstitutional, the EPA will expend
more time, money, and court resources than would have been
conserved during an informal ACO process. The absence of
ACOs does not render the EPA defenseless or void; it still has
the ultimate avenues of statutory enforcement available- the
courts.

The Silvery Minnow:
Rio Grande’s Canary in
the Coal Mine

I

n a highly anticipated ruling released on June 12, 2003, the
10 th Circuit Court of Appeals in Denver, Colorado,
upheld a New Mexico District Court’s decision allowing
the Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”) to release water from
dams along the Middle Rio Grande River to preserve the
endangered silvery minnow.1 This case has become a “showdown in the West” between man’s need for water versus
animals’, in this case a protected species under the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”).2 It set legal precedents for water rights in
New Mexico and other arid areas of the United States and
may have saved the endangered silvery minnow from
extinction.3
The controversy at issue arose from two acts of
Congress: The Sam Juan-Chama Project (“SJCP”) and the
Middle Rio Grande Project (“MRGP”).4 The SJCP authorized
the Secretary of the Interior, acting on behalf of the Bureau
of Reclamation, to enter into a contract with the City of
Albuquerque to furnish water for municipal, domestic, and
industrial uses for which the city would pay the costs for
constructing the Heron Dam, the enlargement of the El Vado
Dam, and general water use for the city.5 The United States
agreed to construct operate, and maintain the MRGC Project
works in exchange for their repayment of construction and
maintenance costs.6 Both of these contracts ensure perpetual
water deliveries to the city of Albuquerque, New Mexico, whose
underground aquifer continues to shrink as its desert population
3
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continues to grow at unprecedented rates.7
The silvery minnow was listed as an endangered species
in 1994.8 This once prosperous species, one of the last five
native species left in the river, now occupies less than 5% of its
historic range.9 The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals quoted
Aletta Belin, attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellees, that the silvery
minnow is the Rio Grande’s equivalent of a canary in a coal
mine; in effect, the silvery minnow is the litmus test for the
health of the Rio Grande ecosystem.10
The main issue before the Court of Appeals was
whether the BOR had the ability to negotiate the amount of
water it supplies to New Mexico by complying with the ESA
in releasing more water for the Rio Grande, the designated
critical habitat for the silvery minnow.11 The BOR maintained
that because their contracts were enacted before 1973 and
contain no express clause that permits the BOR to reduce
deliveries of project water below their fixed amounts that they
were unable to comply with the ESA.12 BOR cited Sierra Club
v. Babbitt to support this argument, which holds that Congress
did not intend for section 7 of the ESA to apply to an agreement
finalized before passage of the ESA where the federal agency
lacks the discretion to influence private activity for the benefit
of the protected species.13
The Court of Appeals distinguished the case from
Sierra Club based on several distinctive clauses contained in the
BOR contracts.14 BOR limited its liability in case of drought
“or other causes” which might affect “the quantity of water
available from the reservoir storage complex.15 The contract
further recognizes that if the actual water supply is less than
normal yield, that the non-federal parties will share what water
is available.16 Therefore, the Court of Appeals held that the
BOR retained discretion to determine the amount of available
water that would be made, including diverting water in times
of scarcity to protect the habitat of an endangered species.17
By affirming, the Court of Appeals also upheld and
affirmed the landmark 1978 decision of TVA v. Hill, placing
endangered species at the highest level of priorities in our
country. TVA v. Hill prioritized the continued existence of the
endangered snail darter above the economic benefits of a nearlycompleted dam. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals decision
in this case sends a strong message to the United States to
conserve and use our water and other natural resources in
sustainable ways.
However, recent legislation proposed by Senator Pete
Domenici (NM), may thwart any chances of survival that the
silvery minnow won by its victory in court. Public opinion
after the 10th Circuit’s ruling coupled with an unprecedented
drought in New Mexico prompted Senator Domenici to
submit his bill as “an effort to stop any radical interpretation
of the ESA on the Rio Grande,” by mandating that the SJCP
and the MRGP water contracts supercede the ESA.18 Although
some environmentalists think that the Bush administration will
encourage this bill, others feel that Domenici’s bill is an
SUMMER/FALL 2003

exaggerated and emotional reaction to the current conditions
in New Mexico.19
If Domenici’s bill passes, it could, in one fatal blow,
effectively render the ESA moot after a thirty-year history of
protecting and promoting endangered and threatened species.
The destiny of the Rio Grande silvery minnow is not solely
about the survival of one species of fish, but the larger
problems our world is only beginning to face: overpopulation,
scarce natural resources, urban sprawl, and sustainable
development.
(EPA ACO Endnotes)
* Mary Margaret McCleroy is a JD candidate at AU Law, degree expected Spring
2004.
1
TVA v. Whitman, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 12830, at *2 (11th Cir. June 24, 2003).
2
Id. at *6.
3
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (a)(3)(D), (c) (2003).
4
42 U.S.C. § 7413 (b).
5
42 U.S.C. § 7413 (d).
6
42 U.S.C. § 7413 (a)(3)(B).
7
42 U.S.C. § 7413 (a)(1).
8
TVA, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 12830, at *8.
9
42 U.S.C. § 7413 (d).
10
TVA, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 12830, at *9, *10.
11
See Id.
12
42 U.S.C. § 7413 (c)(1), (d); TVA, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 12830 *10.
13
Respondent’s Brief for the EPA at *12, Alaska Dep’t of Env’t Conservation v. EPA
(No. 02-658).
14
Respondent’s Brief at *19, Alaska Dep’t of Env’t Conservation (No. 02-658).
15
See Id.
(Silvery Minnow Endnotes)
1
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, D.C. No. CIV-99-1320 JP/RLP, 2003 U.S.
App. LEXIS 11672, at *5-6 (10th Cir. N.M. June 12, 2003).
2
See Douglas Jehl, Take City’s Water or Let Minnow Die, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 2003, at
A1 (This case poses the most direct confrontation yet between the ESA...and
the waters rights held by cities like Albequerque in Western states where water
is becoming increasingly scarce...”).
3
Kate Nash, City, Fish See Fates in Court, Albuquerque Tribune, Jan. 13, 2003,
available at: http://www.abqtrib.com/archives/news03/
011303_news_fish.shtml.
4
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 11672, at *31.
5
Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 620 (2003).
6
Flood Control Acts of 1948 and 1950, 33 U.S.C. §§ 701(s), 701(f)-(2) (2003).
7
See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 11672, at *31.
8
50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1999).
9
Appellate Court Affirms Bureau of Reclamation’s Responsibility to Conserve Rio Grande
Ecosystem, available at: http://www.fguardians.org/news/pr030612.html.
10
See Id.
11
50 C.F.R. 17.11; See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 11672, at
*5.
12
See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 11672, at *48-50.
13
Id.
14
See Id. at *55.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Thomas Hargrove, Domenici Move in Minnow Case a Credible Threat to Endangered
Species Act, Enviros Say, ALBUQUERQUE TRIBUNE, June 20, 2003, available at: http://
www.abqtrib.com/archives/news03/062103_news_minnow.shtml.
19
See Id.
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FEATURE ARTICLE
EMPOWERING THE WIND:

OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO WIND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES

By Dave Newman *
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a world in which power plants and
automobiles produce zero pollution, where climate change
becomes a manageable problem instead of a growing threat,
where farmers and ranchers harvest energy crops alongside
agricultural ones, and the Great Plains displaces the Middle
East as the main source of energy in the United States. With a
combination of policies, incentives, and market transformation,
this dream could become a reality within many of our lifetimes.
Wind energy is poised to serve as the foundation of
this new clean and sustainable energy economy. Energy derived
from wind produces no pollution, very little environmental
impact, and has become cost competitive with other
commercial energy sources. Since 1995, wind energy has grown
at about 30% throughout the world, faster than any other energy
source.1 Although this growth is encouraging, wind still only
accounts for a tiny fraction of world energy supplies and many
obstacles continue to block broader adoption of wind
technologies.2
Tapping into this unlimited resource would also serve
to stabilize U.S. energy supply and reduce dependence on
foreign sources of energy. The continuous flow of wind
power could serve as a hedge against the volatility of natural
gas, oil and other world energy supplies. In addition, mining
clean sources of domestic energy would reduce our dependence
on countries that harbor or finance terrorist activities.
Abundant and cheap wind energy could also be used
to electrolyze water to create hydrogen. This would serve as a
clean and dependable source of fuel for clean-burning fuel cell
engines that are expected to begin displacing internal
combustion engines over the next two decades. As these new
technologies develop, the United States (“U.S.”) could utilize
its vast wind resources to lead the world to a cleaner energy
future.
This paper analyzes the development of the wind
industry in the United States and the policies and programs
that have been used to spur its growth. Section One discusses
the economic and environmental benefits of wind energy today
and tracks its recent growth within the U.S. and around the
world. Section Two identifies and explains many of the
obstacles to growth, including price distortions, discriminatory
transmission policies, infrastructure limitations, and local
opposition. Section Three includes a discussion of the federal
and state incentives in place today and analyzes their impact on
wind energy development throughout the country. Section
Four provides case studies of several states that have led the
SUMMER/FALL 2003

way in promoting and developing their wind energy resources.
Finally, Section Five presents policy recommendations to
maximize wind energy growth in the future.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC
BENEFITS TO WIND
A combination of energy efficiency programs and
large-scale renewable energy development would significantly
reduce a number of environmental and public health problems
while spurring substantial economic growth. Improving energy
efficiency is widely accepted as the cheapest, fastest, and most
environmentally benign way to meet energy demand.
Unfortunately, U.S. utilities have moved away from energy
efficiency over the past decade, cutting efficiency programs by
45% from 1993 through 1998.3 The U.S. could produce the
same amount of goods and services using 30% less energy by
using energy as efficiently as the European Union.4
A. Environmental Dividends
Increasing the global share of wind and other
renewables in the overall energy supply would significantly
reduce the public health and environmental costs of fossil fuel
and nuclear energy. Coal-burning power plants cause severe
public health problems ranging from summer smog alerts to
asthma, respiratory disease, and even death.5 Reliance on coal
also creates enormous environmental impacts including acid
rain and the pollution resulting from mining.6 Nuclear power
presents a unique set of concerns, including waste disposal,
radioactive exposure, and security.7
Wind energy produces no greenhouse gasses or other
pollutants and could help the U.S. and other large polluters
begin mitigating the potentially disastrous effects of climate
change.8 Unless significant steps are taken to reduce greenhouse
gasses, the United States could expect to lose up to 14,000
square miles of coastal land by the end of this century due to
rising sea levels.9 The Bush Administration’s most recent report
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change anticipates the following impacts associated with human
induced climate change: temperature rises of 5–9°F, ecosystem
shifting, widespread water shortages, loss of forest services,
excacerbated water and air pollution, and more volatile and
disruptive storms.10
Wind is a clean, renewable, and domestic source of
energy that could supply the entire U.S. with electricity.11 If the
U.S. replaced about 8600 Megawatts (“MW”) of fossil fuel
power with wind and other non-polluting energy sources over
the next 10 years (about double U.S. installed capacity at the
end of 2001), U.S. greenhouse gas emissions could be stabilized
5

at current levels.12 The seven windiest states in the country
have the potential to produce nearly 100 times that installed
capacity.13 And when these goals are combined with improved
energy efficiency and a cleaner burning automobile fleet, it is
entirely possible to see how the U.S. could reduce its greenhouse
gas emissions to well below what would have been required
under the Kyoto Protocol.
B. Wind Energy Makes Economic Sense
In addition to its environmental benefits, wind energy
has increasingly become a wise economic investment.
Technolog y breakthroughs combined with beneficial
government incentives has driven down costs from $0.35/
kWh in 1980 to about $0.04/kWh today.14 The Department
of Energy (“DOE”) and the Electric Power Research Institute
projects that continued technological advances will drive the
price down to $0.03/kWh by 2004 in high wind areas and
between $0.03-$0.04/kWh at more moderate wind sites by
2007-2015.15
Several other factors account for the drop in the cost
of utility-scale wind power. Improved wind mapping and
turbine siting has enabled wind developers to take advantage
of better wind conditions, which drives down costs
exponentially. Relatively minor increases in average wind speed
can dramatically boost output and lower costs. For example, a
large power plant in an area that has an average of 7.15 mps
wind produces energy at about double the cost of a wind
farm with an average of 9.32 mps wind.16
Inexpensive computing technolog y has also
contributed to reducing the cost of wind power over the past
two decades. Such advanced technology has enabled designers
to use extremely sophisticated models to improve machine
designs, reduced and streamlined manufacturing costs while
improving quality, and allowed operators the ability to remotely
monitor and control turbines and more efficiently conduct
routine preventative maintenance.17
In addition to wind speed, the size of the wind farm
also affects the cost of the power generated. In general, a
facility with more installed generating capacity will produce
power more cheaply than a smaller facility. This results from
the larger facility’s ability to spread the cost of transmission,
interconnection to the grid, and other fixed costs over a larger
number of power producing turbines. The American Wind
Energy Association estimates that a 51MW wind facility can
generate electricity $0.023/kWh cheaper than a 3MW facility.18
In most cases, that price differential is the difference between a
particular project’s commercial viability.
Another factor affecting the cost of electricity from
wind is project financing. A wind power project’s initial
construction costs can be up to 40% cheaper when built and
financed internally by a public utility as compared with a privately
owned and financed independent power producer.19 This
results in part from more restrictive financing terms for
privately owned and financed projects. Such restrictions are
not imposed when a utility is financing its own project.
Wind energy also makes economic sense for the
communities in which it is harnessed. Farmers and ranchers,
whose land might generate $120 worth of grain or $20 worth
of beef per acre, can make $2,000 or more by leasing their
land to wind developers.20 In addition, wind turbines can coSUMMER/FALL 2003

exist with farming, ranching and other rural land-uses, using
only about 5% of the landmass on which they are installed.21
As farmers and ranchers find it increasingly difficult to stay
afloat, wind energy could become a clean cash crop that could
help to revive sagging rural economies throughout the country.
A recent study estimated that the 240 MW of wind power
installed in Iowa from 1998-99 created 200 short-term
construction jobs, 40 new permanent jobs, $2 million in new
local tax revenue, and $640,000 annually in lease payments to
landowners.22
C. Recent Growth
The modern wind energy industry has matured
significantly over the last decade. The industry had total sales
of $5.2 billion in 2001 and is expected to nearly double within
the next 5 years.23 Since 1990, worldwide wind energy has
grown from just under 2000 MW installed capacity to nearly
30,000 MW, enough power to meet the demand of
approximately 35 million people at typical consumption rates
in economically developed countries.24
Given the beneficial environmental and economic
attributes of wind, it is not surprising that it has become the
fastest growing energy source in the world today. In the mid1990’s Europe surpassed the U.S. as the global leader in wind
energy production. Today, nearly three-quarters of the world’s
wind power is generated in the European Union (“E.U.”).25
After a lull in new wind generating capacity throughout the
mid-1990’s in the U.S., capacity expanded by more than 66%
in 2001 to a total of 4260 MW.26 Despite this huge jump in
capacity, wind energy still only produces 0.3% of the nation’s
electricity supply.27
A large reason why the U.S. is falling behind the E.U.
in new wind energy development is their divergent policies on
global warming. Despite being the world’s top emitter of
greenhouse gasses, the Bush Administration has withdrawn the
United States from the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.
Ignoring the fact that the U.S. has some of the most abundant
untapped wind and solar resources in the world, current U.S.
climate change policy instead follows a voluntary approach
that does not strive for overall greenhouse gas reductions. In
fact, the U.S. DOE currently projects a 17% increase in U.S.
emissions by 2012, an average increase of 26.63 million metric
tones per year.28
In sharp contrast to the U.S., the E.U. and its member
nations have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, with a commitment
to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 8% below 1990 levels
by 2008-12.29 The European Climate Change Program has
been created to coordinate the actions of its member nations
and to establish an emissions trading system.30 On September
27, 2001, the E.U. issued a renewable energy directive
demonstrating its commitment to increasing its reliance on
renewables as a way to combat climate change and to promote
“the security and diversification of energy supply, environmental
protection and social and economic cohesion.”31
The U.S. has abundant sources of wind that, if
harnessed, could more than supply the nation’s energy needs.
However, the windiest states in the country currently take little
advantage of their vast wind resources. The windiest 7 states
have nearly 68% of nation’s wind potential but only produce
23% of the nation’s wind power today. 32 In contrast, the top
7 producing states have only 24% of the nation’s wind energy
6

potential but currently produce almost 80% of the nation’s
wind energy.33
II. OBSTACLES TO GROWTH
Modern wind energ y development has been
inconsistent in the U.S. over the past thirty years. Following the
energy crises of the 1970’s, the state of California singlehandedly put large-scale wind power on the map. Favorable
regulations and relatively high long-term electricity prices helped
to sustain wind energy growth in California until the early 1990’s.
In the 1990’s, wind energy began to boom throughout
the world due to technological improvements and lower costs.
At the same time, development stalled in the U.S. because of
the expiration of favorable long-term contracts and a plentiful
supply of cheap fossil fuels. Ironically, the promising, clean
technology that was pioneered in the U.S. was becoming big
business overseas while the U.S. sat on the sidelines. By the end
of the 1990’s, a number of factors led to a revival in U.S. wind
energy development. These included renewable energy
provisions attached to electric deregulation legislation in many
states, the effect of state and federal incentives, and a growing
awareness of and concern over global warming.
Although wind energy has grown cost competitive
with other more traditional sources of power over the past
decade, several obstacles impede progress towards wind
becoming a major component of the nation’s energy portfolio.
These obstacles include price distortion, discriminatory
transmission policies, infrastructure limitations, and local
opposition.
Removing these barriers would unleash powerful
market forces and spur significant job creation, sustainable
economic growth, dramatic reductions of smog, soot, and
greenhouse gas emissions, and increased U.S. energy
independence. Fortunately, the collective experiences of several
of the nation’s leading wind-producing states as well as the
innovative policies of the European Union and some its
member countries provide a blueprint for creating effective
policies that create opportunities for growth.
A. Price Distortion: External Costs and Market-Skewing
Subsidies
Even at near-competitive prices, the cost of wind
energy remains artificially high because it does not reflect many
of its beneficial environmental attributes. Every MW of power
produced by wind reduces the environmental and societal cost
of pollution from fossil or nuclear power plants. If these
external costs were adequately reflected in the price of energy,
the cost of wind energy would appear significantly cheaper
than it does at currently calculated prices.
According to Lester Brown, director of the Earth
Policy Institute, “the key to sustaining economic growth is telling
the ecological truth.”34 Unfortunately, unbalanced subsidies
combined with current accounting methods that externalize
environmental and public health costs prevent energy markets
from accurately reflecting the ecological truth in the cost of
energy.35 The disproportionate allocation of government
support for non-renewable energy artificially lowers the market
price of energy generated from these sources. This distorts
the relative cost of energy from different sources and limits or
expands the ability for certain technologies to develop
commercially.
SUMMER/FALL 2003

A study done by the Renewable Energy Policy Project
found that fission-related nuclear power received subsidies
amounting to $15.30/kWh during the first 15 years (1947-61)
of federal support, whereas wind received only $0.46/kWh
over the course of its first 15 years (1975-89).36 These
unbalanced subsidies have allowed a comparatively
uneconomical nuclear energy source to defy market influences
by artificially concealing its true cost. In 2002, fossil fuels
received approximately ten times and nuclear power more than
two and a half times the total amount of tax breaks and
subsidies as renewable energy.37 Notwithstanding the federal
government’s relative lack of support for wind energy, the
technology and the markets have managed to develop to the
point where wind is nearly economically competitive despite
these market distortions.
Source: See Note 75
In addition to unbalanced subsidies, the external
environmental and public health costs of polluting nonrenewables are also not currently reflected in consumer prices.
Examples of such externalities include: health care costs from
increased respiratory disease, loss of productivity stemming
from absenteeism at work and school, the loss of forest services
do to acid rain and other pollutants, water pollution from fuel
extraction, and the impact on fisheries from mercury and other
airborne pollutants. If these costs were incorporated into the
market price of energy, the cost of wind and other clean
renewables would remain level while the cost of coal, oil and
other polluting fuels would increase substantially.
B. Discriminatory Transmission Policies & Infrastructure
Limitations
This section discusses how transmission issues impede
progress towards more wind power development by
considering the following: how certain transmission policies
discriminate against wind power; how system inefficiencies limit
the availability of transmission services; and the impact of
limited transmission infrastructure near some of the nation’s
windiest sites.
1. Discriminatory Scheduling and
Interconnection Policies
Perhaps the greatest impediment to the development
of wind resources in the U.S. today is an outdated transmission
interconnection policy that discriminates against intermittent
power producers like wind and solar. This, in part, is the result
of a regulatory framework that was created by and for
monopoly-controlled utilities with traditional fossil and nuclear
power plants in mind. Although deregulation has brought with
it a promise of true competition and customer choice, progress
has been slow towards realizing that goal.
a. Scheduling Penalties
The most difficult transmission obstacle for wind
producers are scheduling penalties that charge generators
whenever they deviate from pre-set delivery schedules. In 1996,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) issued
an Order requiring that utilities under their jurisdiction open
their transmission lines to a wider range of wholesale
customers.38 The Order established rules for open access that
favored traditional large fossil fuel and nuclear plants at the
expense of wind, solar, and other intermittent resources. In
order to ensure system stability, reliability, and predictability the
Order established rules that severely penalize scheduling
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deviations regardless of whether the result of intentional
manipulation or due to the intermittence of the energy
resource.39
The American Wind Energy Association and others
propose a variety of solutions that promote non-discriminatory
scheduling policies while simultaneously ensuring overall system
stability. These include real-time balancing markets, the
elimination of scheduling penalties, and allowing electricity
generators to schedule as close to real time as possible.40 Realtime balancing markets charge or credit wholesalers for
deviations based on the value of the energy at the time of the
deviation. This allows for market based efficiencies to influence
wholesalers’ behavior and eliminates unfair and arbitrary
penalties for those, like wind producers, who cannot control
precisely when they will be generating power.41
b. Interconnection Fees & Agreements
Interconnection fees that are based on peak output as
opposed to overall transmission usage severely limit wind
power’s access to the grid. Although such a fee structure makes
sense in allocating charges to an energy producer that is sending
a steady and constant flow of electricity at or close to peak
capacity over the grid, it unfairly penalizes wind energy
producers that rarely achieve peak output. These fees put wind
at a competitive disadvantage with more traditional, polluting
sources of power because they are forced to recover the cost
of these fees over fewer kWh’s than their competition.42
Complex interconnection agreements often stand in
the way of small-scale (less than 2 MW) power producers from
developing their projects. Unless utilities are required to simplify
the process of connecting to the grid with simpler, standardized
contracts, they have little incentive to accommodate these small
producers. Some states, like Minnesota, have successfully
pressured utilities to adopt such standard interconnection
agreements, which enable more small wind producers to come
on line.43
c. Embedded Costs
Another concern for wind power producers relying
on the grid is the way in which the embedded costs required
for construction and operation of the existing transmission
infrastructure are distributed amongst users. In some parts of
the country, transmission owners charge these embedded costs
to generators based upon the distance between the generating
facility and the nearest “load center.”44 Because wind generation
often occurs in remote locations far from where the energy
will ultimately be consumed, wind generators are
disproportionately penalized by such cost allocations.
d. “Pancaking” (Duplicative) Fees
A fourth problem for wind energy is the current
structure in use throughout most of the country whereby the
access fees charged by transmission operators “pancake” on
top of each other. This requires generators that are
geographically distant from their customers to pay the
cumulative fees charged by any transmission owner whose lines
they are using instead of paying one fee relative to their overall
use of the grid.45
2. Availability of Limited Transmission
Capacity for Wind
Another transmission obstacle to wind power is that
existing transmission capacity is limited due to system
inefficiencies and a lack of transmission infrastructure in many
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of the country’s windiest locations. In some states, limited
interstate transmission capacity has not only dissuaded
investments in wind power but has also led to strong industry
opposition to adoption of state-wide incentives and programs
to study and encourage wind energy development. For
example, energy interests in South Dakota, an electricity
exporting state with tremendous wind resources, have blocked
efforts to increase wind energy development because they fear
that it would compete with existing electricity exports generated
mainly from coal.46 As a result, the windiest state in the country
currently produces only 3 MW of wind power.47
Thermal, voltage, and system operating constraints
stemming from outdated technology create inefficiencies that
severely limit the amount of power that can safely be transmitted
over the grid.48 As wind generators and other power producers
compete for an increasingly limited amount of transmission
capacity, alleviation of these constraints will allow more power
to flow over the grid and reduce the need for new transmission
construction. Upgrading the transmission infrastructure to
increase capacity is also cheaper than building new power lines.49
Other improvements and upgrades such as replacing mechanical
switching systems with fiber optics and integrated computer
systems would allow system operators the ability to move more
power more quickly without sacrificing quality or safety.50 Such
improvements could lead to an increase in productivity and
efficiency of the energy system by at least 30%.51
3. Stringing Wires – Expanding the Grid
A common concern regarding transmission obstacles
to new wind development is the need to string wires out to
remote locations with the best wind resource availability. There
are two major issues related to this concern: the environmental
and social impact of new power lines and identifying who
should be responsible for installing and managing these interstate
regional routes.
The impacts of new power lines and transmission
facilities, however, must be balanced against the impacts of
existing polluting and fuel-intensive power plants. The
environmental and public health costs of building new
transmission infrastructure out to clean renewable energy
sources is a tiny price to pay in relation to the benefits of reduced
air and water pollution, decreased respiratory illness, and lower
greenhouse gas emissions. The emphasis must not only be on
increasing the overall amount of wind and other renewable
energy that is generated, but also on dramatically increasing
energy efficiency so that renewables become an increasing
percentage of overall energy use.
C. Local Opposition
Despite economic and environmental benefits of wind
power, some wind projects face local grassroots opposition
to development. This opposition usually stems from
environmental concerns such as wind turbines’ impact on
migratory bird flyways or fisheries (in the case of offshore
turbines) and visual and noise disturbance.
Cape Cod has recently become a hotbed of local
opposition to a proposed wind farm in Nantucket Sound.
The $500 million project would be the largest wind facility in
the country: consisting of 170 turbines approximately 5 miles
off shore that would stretch over 25 square miles and produce
a peak output of 420 MW (enough to power over half of the
Cape).52 The Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound is organizing
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opposition to the project claiming that it will create a
“permanent industrial facility in a pristine natural environment.”53
To assuage public concerns and minimize environmental
impacts, wind energy projects must be subject to public
participation.
Indeed, utility scale wind farms can have serious
environmental impact if they are sited improperly. A common
concern is the impact wind facilities have on birds. Although
avian deaths continue to occur due to collisions and
electrocution, the numbers are very small relative to avian
mortality resulting from other human structures like vehicles
and plate glass.54 Even these deaths can be minimized, however,
with careful siting of turbines, proper study of birds sight and
flight patterns, and reducing the number of wind measurement
towers.55 It also should be kept in mind that the environmental
impacts of wind facilities are extremely small when compared
with those of fossil fuel and other traditional polluting plants,
in addition to the impact caused extracting and transporting
fuel and waste.
III. OPPORTUNITIES FOR GROWTH
Many of the obstacles discussed in the preceding section
can be addressed by implementing and strengthening policies
and incentives supporting wind energy. For example, mandates
that require utilities to develop wind energy projects force those
utilities to become strong advocates for ensuring that their
regional transmission policy is favorable to wind. And once
transmission policy is reformed, an increasing number of wind
projects would become commercially viable independent of
government mandates.
Myriad policy tools have been used throughout the
country in an effort to spur this type of growth, although not
often in an integrated and comprehensive fashion. While some
states such as Minnesota, Texas and California have taken an
active approach to encouraging renewables, others have done
little. In addition, effective federal policies such as the Production
Tax Credit have been enacted only for short periods, allowed
to expire, and then reenacted for another short term. This
inconsistent approach has created boom and bust cycles of
investment rather than encouraging a stable and long-term
investment environment that would best benefit the growth
of these nascent renewable energy industries.
Support and incentives from federal programs are
uniformly available throughout the country. However, state
and local policies and incentives for wind are by no means
uniform. In fact, much of the disparity in wind production
between particular states can be attributed to the degree to
which state incentives and programs actively promote the
technology. Creating an appropriate, efficient, and effective
governance structure is an essential step towards widespread
and pervasive renewable energy development. Policymakers
must choose wisely among a broad array of options by
harmonizing the policies of different governmental entities and
across competing energy industry sectors. These range from
market based mechanisms such as ecological tax reform to
regulatory approaches such as stricter pollution controls. Absent
a more integrated and comprehensive approach, the enactment
of disjointed and uncoordinated renewable energy policies runs
the risk of redundancy, impotence, and a lack of popular
support. The following is a discussion of a variety of renewable
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energy policies that have been used within the United States
and Europe. The list is not exhaustive.
A. Governmental Support for Market Stimulation &
Commercialization
1. Research Development & Demonstration
(RD&D)
The U.S. DOE’s Wind Energy Program provides
support for research and development of wind energy
technologies and serves as a clearinghouse of important
information for industry and government decision-makers,
public interest organizations, and the general public. The
program is run through the National Renewable Energy
Laboratory’s National Wind Technology Center in Golden,
Colorado and the Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque,
New Mexico. The Program is divided into three research areas:
Applied Research, Turbine Research, and Cooperative Research
and Testing.56
The Applied Research division focuses on developing
technological breakthroughs in turbine engineering and
manufacturing. To accomplish this, they analyzes wind dynamics,
aerodynamic and structural design, and work to develop more
sophisticated control systems and components.57
The Turbine Research division develops public-private
partnerships to research, design, build, test and refine
commercial wind energy systems. Private partners are invited
to participate based on a competitive solicitation process and,
once chosen, share in part of the cost of the project.58
The Cooperative Research division works to educate
and involve the public to help foster broader market acceptance
of wind energy. The division also works to help the electric
industry integrate wind into the energy supply.59
In total, the Wind Energy Program received $40 million
in FY2001 to carry out its work.60 By contrast, federal R&D
funding for coal was $170 million in FY2001.61
2. Public Benefits Funds/System Benefits
Charges
Public Benefits Funds (“PBF”) are typically used to
ensure continual financial support for state renewable energy
programs, energy efficiency programs, and low-income energy
assistance. The funds are supported by small charges that are
regularly assessed on electricity consumption in the state. Fifteen
states currently have some sort of PBF in place and all but one
(Maine) require mandatory charges.62
Massachusetts established a Public Benefits Fund that
will direct $150 million over five years to renewable energy
programs.63 The fund’s resources are currently being focused
on development of green buildings, distributed renewable
power, and a green power development program.64 The fund
also provides grant money for projects developing renewable
power technologies and for the purchase of green power.65
Oregon’s Public Benefits Fund assesses a 3% surcharge
on all electricity users inthe state.66 This raises $60 million per
year, 13% of which has been earmarked for renewable energy
programs.67
California leads the nation with its $540 million
renewable energy trust fund.68 Of that amount, $240 million
will be spent on the development and maintenance of existing
renewable projects and $161 million on new projects.69 As of
the fall of 2001, funding made available under the program
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has supported the development of over 900MW of new wind
generating capacity in the state.70
3. Government Green Power Purchases/
Aggregation
One of the most effective ways government entities
can support growth in renewable energy markets is through
Green Power Purchases whereby they commit to purchase large
quantities of renewable energy over an extended period of
time. By directing its purchases in this way, governments can
dramatically increase demand for renewables, thereby helping
to create economies of scale that reduce price and increase
reliability. Directed government purchasing has been one of
the most effective ways of establishing viable commercial
markets for recycled paper and other materials.
The U.S. government is the largest single energy user
in the country, spending over $4 billion annually on electricity.71
Several federal pilot projects have begun where certain
government agencies have agreed to purchase renewable energy.
States and municipalities throughout the country have also agreed
to such purchases. The city of Santa Monica, California became
the first city in the country to switch over to 100% renewables
in June 1999.72 The agreement calls for approximately 5MW
of green power for which the city will pay a 5% premium.73
The energy is provided by The Geysers – the world’s largest
geothermal resource.74
B. Financial Policy
1. Production Tax Credits
Originally passed into law as part of the Energy Policy
Act of 1992, the Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit
(“PTC”) allows wind energy producers a $0.015/kWh credit
for ten years after a qualified facility enters service.75 Adjusted
for inflation, the credit is worth $0.018/kWh today. The
availability of the PTC has served as an essential tool in enabling
wind energy producers to secure financing for projects that
otherwise may not have been available to them. Because the
credit depends on production instead of a facility’s rated
capacity, it creates incentives for increased efficiency in design
and operating productivity.
Although originally set to expire at the end of 2001, in
March of 2002, Congress extended the credit for two years
until the end of 2003.76 Legislation currently pending would
further extend the credit to the end of 2006.77 The DOE’s
Energy Information Administration predicts that the availability
of the extended tax credit would result in a 17.24% increase in
the non-hydroelectric renewable share of the total U.S. electricity
market by 2020.78
The PTC has been one of the most important market
drivers for wind energy over the past decade, enabling wind
to compete economically with more traditional forms of
subsidized energy like gas, coal, and nuclear. However,
uncertainty surrounding the availability of the credit over the
long-term has undermined some of its beneficial effect. Wind
developers and their financial backers continually struggle to
plan projects beyond the current deadline of the credit because
they are unsure if the political environment will support yet
another extension.
2. Production Incentives
Similar to the PTC, the Renewable Energy Production
Incentive (“REPI”) provides direct financial support for wind
energy development. REPI is available to government-owned
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wind production facilities as well as not-for-profit electric
cooperatives. Instead of a tax credit, however, qualified facilities
are eligible for annual incentive payments of $0.018/kWh
(inflation adjusted) for the first ten years of operation and
payments are subject to the availability of annually appropriated
funds. The program has paid out $2,440,907 to wind energy
producers from 1995 through 2001 for over 150 million kWh
generated.79
In addition to the federal production incentive (REPI),
13 states also currently provide some form of renewable
energy production incentive.80 Minnesota’s “Wind Energy
Generation Incentive” establishes a production payment of
$0.015/kWh for facilities under 2MW.81 The payment was
implemented to help developers of small wind farms who
may not have a large enough tax liability to take advantage of
the federal tax credit. Qualifying renewable energy facilities in
the state may receive the payment in addition to the $0.018/
kWh credit available at the federal level.82
3. Electricity Feed Laws
Electricity Feed Laws (“EFL”) mandate fixed payments
by utilities for renewable
energy generated by independent power producers. Germany,
Denmark, and Spain have relied on such laws over the past
decade to spur the development of well over half of the world’s
wind energy generating capacity within those countries.83
Enacted in 1990, Germany’s EFL specified rates that
were calculated as a percentage of average electricity prices
and were set differently depending on the source of the power.84
By requiring utilities to purchase renewable energy from
independent power producers at commercially attractive rates,
the economic climate for renewable investments in Germany
stabilized and became predictable, thereby ushering in an era
of serious investment opportunities. As a result, Germany
experienced a 5000-fold increase in wind energy capacity since
1990.85
In 1997, Spain enacted energy legislation setting a goal
of doubling the nation’s renewable energy supply to 12% by
2010.86 The law requires utilities to acquire all renewable energy
from approved projects and mandates premium payments for
renewable energy.87 For example, electricity produced from
wind or hydro power will receive a premium of approximately
$0.03/kWh until 2007.
4. Ecological Tax Reform / Carbon Tax
More comprehensive than production tax credits, feed
laws, or subsidies, Ecological Tax Reform (“ETR”) increases
taxes on polluting energy sources while simultaneously reducing
the tax burden on employment, thus reducing demand for
polluting sources of energy and stimulating job creation. In
1999, Germany embarked on three-stage tax reform policy as
a way of promoting employment and sustainable economic
growth while also protecting natural resources. The policy’s
rationale is to shift the tax burden from employment to energy
in order to spur efficiency, innovation, job creation.88 The first
stage imposed a new tax on electricity, fuels, heating oil, and
natural gas.89 Although the new tax policy does not distinguish
between electricity from renewable sources and that from
polluting sources, the expected revenue generated from the
tax on renewable power will be diverted back into a green
energy fund dedicated to promoting renewable energy
investments.90
10

Although the goals and overall policy of ETR in
Germany are consistent with internalizing external
environmental costs, the polluter pays principle, and sustainable
development generally, some have argued that it does not go
far enough and fails to harmonize with other inconsistent policy
objectives being furthered in Germany. For example, the tax
reform does not eliminate or even reduce subsidies currently
being provided to the German coal industry due to pressure
from coal miners in the Ruhr region.91 In addition, lower
environmental tax rates have been built into the ETR for
companies in the manufacturing, agricultural, and forestry
sectors in order to limit the short-term economic burden on
economic growth.92
Despite these inefficiencies, the German Institute for
Economic Research has concluded that the German ETR will
result in a 2-3% reduction in CO2 emissions in the medium
term and create 250,000 new jobs by 2010.93 Despite the
employment benefits of the ETR, economists fear that the
short term increase in energy prices imposed by the increase in
taxes could create a drag on gross domestic product and
economic expansion.94 In response to this concern, some
economists have advocated diverting a portion of the revenue
generated by the tax into increased R & D for domestic
industries.95 One such study found that using 15% of new
revenues for such purposes could ameliorate the negative drag
on GDP without significantly reducing the benefits to
employment growth and the reduction in CO2 emissions.96
5. Tax Deductions / Exemptions
States employ a variety of tax-based incentives to
promote renewable energy investments. Over half provide
some type of corporate income tax deduction, 28 states allow
for property tax breaks for property with installed renewables,
and 18 states cut or eliminate sales tax on renewable energy
equipment.97
Some states, like Massachusetts, allow a sales tax
exemption on the sale of renewable equipment that will be
used for residential purposes.98 Others, like Minnesota, exempt
sales tax for any purchaser of renewable equipment,
commercial or residential.99 States also differ in what type of
equipment they will exempt from sales tax. Iowa, for example,
allows for the total cost of the wind energy equipment as well
as any materials used to manufacture that equipment.100
A range of corporate tax credits and deductions are
available that allow a corporation to deduct up to 35% of the
cost of renewable energy equipment and/or the cost of
installation of such equipment. Some states limit these incentives
to facilities with installed generating capacity above or below a
certain rated power threshold.101
C. Market Obligations / Renewable Portfolio Standards
(RPS)
Renewable Portfolio Standards require that energy
generators produce a specified portion of their electricity from
renewable resources. Utilities can choose to generate the power
themselves, purchase it from another producer, or secure the
equivalent quantity through Renewable Energy Credits
(“RECs”). Over time, the percentage of energy that must come
from renewable sources increases as a percentage of the state’s
energy portfolio.
REC’s represent a specified unit of renewable
electricity that has been consumed in the state, regardless of
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who actually produces the power. The credits enable utilities
in areas without good wind resources to meet their renewable
requirement by purchasing credits from power producers in
windy areas. This encourages the most promising renewable
resources to be developed by ensuring that there is a market
for their energy product.
This is a hybrid approach that relies on both state
mandates and market mechanisms to achieve its goal of
increasing the percentage of renewables used in the state. Many
of the ideas behind the trading system stem from the existing
Clean Air Act permit system that has successfully reduced sulfur
dioxide across the country. For an RPS to effectively increase
the use of renewables, however, the definition of “renewable
energy” included in the standard must be limited to resources
that are truly renewable like wind, solar, and geothermal. By
choosing what types of renewables will satisfy the RPS mandate,
states can dictate their energy portfolios while relying on market
forces to determine how the standards will be met. At the end
of a specified period (usually every year), utilities and other
electricity retailers must have a certain amount of REC’s or
must be forced to pay a penalty.
Fifteen states have adopted portfolio standards as a
way of ensuring that renewables comprise an increasing portion
of electricity consumed within the state.102 For example,
Massachusetts created an RPS in its 1997 deregulation legislation
that mandates 4.5% renewables by 2009 and then increases 1%
per year thereafter.103 Under the program, generators may
purchase renewable energy credits from a corporation set up
by the state’s Renewable Energy Trust.104 For 2003, a 1MW
credit will cost $50 (or $0.05/kWh) which is expected to be
more than the incremental cost of installing new renewable
power sources.105 This provides an incentive for utilities to
support new renewable energy projects instead of simply
purchasing more expensive credits in order to meet their
obligations under the RPS.
Texas established its RPS and credit program through a rule
issued by the state’s Public Utilities Commission in December
of 1999.106 The program requires 2000MW of new renewable
energy by 2009 and allocates each retailer a share based upon
its share of the state’s retail market.107 Since the RPS was
announced, Texas has added over 915MW of wind generating
capacity, with immediate plans for at least 220 more.108
In addition to statewide programs, momentum is building for
the creation of a national RPS. Such a program would promote
renewable energy evenly throughout the country, thereby
encouraging the most efficient means of generating power. In
addition, a national program would help to spur a regionally
based approach to overcoming many of the transmission
limitations impeding growth in wind energy development in
the windiest locations like the Dakotas and Great Plains states.
According to a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists, a
National RPS requiring 20% renewables by 2020 would create
$80 billion in new capital investments, generate $5 billion in
new local tax revenues, and create $1.2 billion in lease payments
to farmers, ranchers and other rural landowners for wind
energy.109
D. Green Power Marketing
1. Green Power Pricing
Green power pricing strives to increase renewable
energy development by allowing consumers to pay a premium
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in exchange for an environmentally preferable energy product.
Although 40 million American homes had been given this choice
as of October 2001, only 350,000 have chosen to buy it.
Consumer demand for green power amongst non-residential
customers is even lower.110
Some states have required that energy providers give
their customers a green power option. As of October 2001,
electric utilities in Minnesota are required to provide a green
power option and may charge a premium amount no more
than the difference between the cost of the renewable energy
and the same amount of nonrenewable energy.111
Some have theorized that the market share of green
power pricing will increase over time in much the same way
that bottled water and organic foods have. The expectation is
based on the idea that choosing an electricity provider is still
foreign to many, but as consumers become more familiar with
the concept and more knowledgeable of their options, more
people will choose the green power option.112
The comparison between premium priced green
power and organic food is incongruous, however, because the
former depends on a minority of dedicated people to pay the
added cost for benefits that are distributed broadly throughout
society. By contrast, people choose to pay extra for organic
food because they personally can reap the benefits. Green
power, however, does not work this way. In many cases, the
environmental benefits of the renewable facility being supported
by increased rates may not be directly noticeable to that
consumer.
Broad social benefits that are felt by all should not rely
on the good will and foresight of a few exceptionally motivated
individuals. The costs associated with such benefits should be
as equally distributed as the benefits themselves.
In theory, green power pricing allows market forces
to dictate which energy resources are utilized. Unfortunately,
there are many practical problems that often prevent this theory
from being realized. Relative costs and benefits of wind versus
more polluting energy sources are not accurately reflected in
the market price. When consumers are given a choice between
$0.03/kWh for coal power or $0.045/kWh for wind, these
prices do not account for health care costs for respiratory
disease stemming from the coal plant’s emissions or the value
of coastal land swallowed up by rising sea levels. If these
costs were internalized into the price of power for the
consumer, there would be no need to market wind as an
environmentally preferable choice, because it would simply be
a cheaper option.
Despite these practical problems, in some cases green
pricing programs have provided a hedge against the volatility
of natural gas and other nonrenewable energy sources. For
example, the city of Austin, Texas established a Green Choice
Program in 2000 that offered consumers the option to pay a
$0.0285/kWh power charge replacing the current $0.0268/
kWh fossil charge to purchase their power from a newly installed
59 turbine 40MW wind farm. The higher green power charge
was guaranteed to remain at that level for 10 years even if the
cost of fossil energy rose above that. Within 10 months, the
program was fully subscribed with 3075 participants. The
addition of this wind power will raise the percentage of
renewable power in the city of Austin from 0.5% to 2.5%.113
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2. Green Energy Certificates
Green Energy Certificates (“GECs”) represent the
beneficial environmental attributes of power that is generated
from a renewable energy source. Instead of paying a premium
for green power, people who purchase green tags are paying
for the environmental benefits of renewable energy investments
occurring regionally or even across the country. GEC programs
allow consumers to pay to help make up the increased cost of
renewables in another state, region, or even country. They can
help overcome some of the physical barriers to large-scale
renewable generation in many locations, alleviate regional
transmission limitations, and compensate for discriminatory
market forces.
However, with these potential benefits, there are also
many potential problems associated with GEC’s. Much of
this stems from the fact that the certificates do not actually
represent a physical commodity like a fixed amount of wind
energy. Instead, they represent the beneficial attributes associated
with the energy generation. In other words, the external
environmental benefits of producing energy from clean,
renewables are captured within the certificate. Creating markets
for these certificates allows these benefits to be internalized by
the marketplace. However, the abstract nature of the certificates
and what they represent can create confusion amongst
consumers and invite fraud amongst green marketers.114
In order to protect consumers against fraud, it is
imperative to establish central registries that track issuances of
renewable energy certificates. Some states, such as Texas, have
already done so as part of their Renewable Portfolio Standard
tracking system. In addition to tracking, sellers of REC’s must
be required to fully disclose what it is they are selling to ensure
that consumers are not misled. This can be accomplished
through labeling and mandatory disclosure requirements.115
PG&E’s National Energy Group developed PureWind
to market the environmental attributes of wind facilities in New
York and California. 116 PG&E’s Madison, New York wind
facility is located over a 120 acre privately owned farm and
came on line at the end of 2000. The facility produces
approximately 24,000 mWh annually, which flows directly into
the New York Independent System Operator grid and is
consumed throughout the state.117
Consumers may purchase PureWind Certificates for
$40 per MWH. Compared with polluting, non-renewable
sources of energy, each PureWind certificate represents a savings
of 5 lbs. sulfur dioxide, (SO2), 2 lbs. nitrogen oxide, (NOx),
and 1000 lbs. carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions. 118 3.
Environmental Generation Disclosure
Environmental disclosure requirements force energy
providers to disclose pertinent information to their customers
regarding price, fuel mix, emissions data and other
environmental costs by fuel type. As retail competition and
consumer choice increases across the country mandatory
disclosure requirements provide essential information to
consumers. More than 20 states have enacted some sort of
mandatory disclosure rule.119 The type of programs that have
been adopted and the information that is required to be
disclosed varies quite a bit from state to state.
For example, since 1998 electric retailers in
Massachusetts are required to provide customers with a
standard disclosure label every quarter. The label must include
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information on price, fuel mix, emissions, and labor
characteristics of generating facilities. The emissions data must
be presented in a format that compares to the regional average
for SOx, NO2, and CO2. In addition, all advertisements must
include a notice that such information is available upon
request.120
E. Reforming the Transmission System
1. FERC’s Solution: Regional Transmission
Organizations
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)
is responsible for regulating the transmission and wholesale
sale of electricity in interstate commerce. In 1999, FERC began
to establish a new policy that would “eliminate any residual
discrimination in transmission services that can occur when the
operation of the transmission service remains in the control
of a vertically integrated utility.”121
The new policy seeks to establish Regional Transmission
Organizations (“RTOs”) that would manage the transmission
infrastructure as an entity independent of interested utilities and
other wholesale electricity providers. In principle, RTO’s are
intended to encourage wholesale competition by removing
transmission barriers for many wholesalers including
intermittent power producers like wind. According to FERC,
RTO’s must have the following characteristics to be approved
as such: independence from market participants; appropriate
scope and characteristics; operational authority over transmission
facilities within its region; and exclusive power to maintain shortterm reliability. 122 In order to achieve this role, RTO’s would
be responsible for the following: designing and administering
its own tariff; managing congestion; taking primary responsibility
for planning and expanding transmission infrastructure; and
participating in inter-regional coordination and reliability
practices.123
Although many of the goals behind the RTO structure
are sound in principal, FERC’s plan still presents many potential
problems. These include the voluntary nature of its membership,
allowing for-profit transmission companies to serve as RTO’s,
the standardization of interconnection between RTO’s
throughout the country, and ensuring that consumer and
environmental concerns are adequately represented in RTO
decisions. FERC’s “voluntary” approach may not effectively
achieve these goals. The FERC Order defining the new policy
(“Order 2000”) simply required that all public utilities dealing
in interstate commerce submit a plan describing how it would
support the establishment of an RTO in its region. Once an
RTO has been established and is approved by FERC, individual
transmission owners and operators within the region retain the
option of not joining the RTO.
Many of these problems are apparent in the December
2001 FERC Order approving the first RTO in the country in
the Midwest. The new Midwest RTO is comprised of
members with vested interests in the energy industry. Members
pay an initial $15,000 fee to join along with $1,000 annual dues.
Members elect a board of directors that is responsible for
maintaining system reliability, ensuring open access to competing
wholesalers, and planning and development of the transmission
infrastructure. Although under the guise of an independent
organization, the ability of local special interests to determine
who sits on the board severely limits the ability of broader
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consumer, environmental, and other public interests to affect
the decisionmaking process.124
FERC may also be organizationally unfit to implement
and administer the transition to the transmission infrastructure
as envisioned by its Order 2000. The GAO recently released a
stinging appraisal of FERC’s capacity to carry out its mission:
“Absent an effective regulatory and oversight approach, FERC
lacks assurance that today’s energy markets are producing
interstate wholesale electricity rates that are just and
reasonable.”125 One of FERC’s biggest weaknesses is its inability
to issue meaningful civil penalties for non-compliance. In
addition, FERC has no authority over many parts of the country
that do not fall under its jurisdiction – either because they do
not deal in interstate commerce like the Electricity Reliability
Council of Texas (“ERCOT”), or because they are part of
some independent federal entity like the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
2. A Public Power Grid
Concerned about the efficacy of FERC’s voluntary
RTO policy, some have called for the development of a truly
public power grid, owned and managed by electricity
consumers. Public Citizen, a public interest watchdog group,
advocates for a non-profit, consumer-owned transmission
systems that would provide non-discriminatory open access
to all energy generators.126 The plan proposes developing nonprofit transmission companies that would buy out current
owners. Unlike RTO’s, the board of directors would be
comprised of consumer advocates, environmentalists, and
other community stakeholders who would be charged with
managing the transmission system in a way that minimizes cost
and environmental impact.
3. Progress Towards Reform
Despite these institutional and regulatory shortcomings,
however, progress is still being made in certain parts of the
country to remove unfair interconnection policies. Several
independent service operators (“ISOs”) have begun addressing
the discriminatory scheduling policies that inhibit wind facilities
from efficiently (if at all) connecting to the grid. For example,
on March 27, 2002 FERC strongly endorsed the California
Independent Service Operator (Cal-ISO) scheduling tariff
amendment.127 Under the new rule, scheduling deviations from
intermittent energy producers will be netted monthly and
deviation penalties will be waived.128 In addition, Cal-ISO will
conduct near real-time forecasts of potential wind energy
generation (paid for by a small fee on the wind generators)
that will be used by wind generators to set their generation
schedules.129
Other ISO’s around the country have also begun to
adopt fairer scheduling policies. NY-ISO completely exempts
all intermittent energy generators from scheduling penalties,
ERCOT currently allows a 50% deviation from schedules for
wind generators, and PJM-ISO (PA, NJ, and MD) has adopted
the FERC Order 2000 proposal allowing all deviations to be
settled at real-time prices without penalties.130
F. Distributed Energy Incentives
The vast majority of all U.S. wind-generating capacity
is currently located on centralized wind farms that connect one
or more utility-scale turbine to the grid.131 Despite this,
significant amounts of wind energy could be generated from
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smaller distributed sources to be used for on-site consumption
with excess energy fed back into the grid.
Distributed energy generation has many advantages
over a centralized grid. Power loss along long-distance
transmission lines is eliminated when power is produced where
it is used. Distributing the energy-generating infrastructure also
reduces opportunities for terrorists to disrupt the nation’s power
system by targeting centralized power plants. In addition, the
aesthetic and environmental impacts of transmission lines, substations, and large-scale energy facilities are lessened as
dependence on the grid decreases. Clean distributed generation
can also reduce peak loads on the transmission infrastructure,
thereby improving the system’s overall reliability.
Many barriers stand in the way of increasing distributed
generation capacity across the country. Kurt Yeager, president
and chief executive officer of the industry-funded Electric
Power Research Institute summarized many of these obstacles
as follows:
One of the big problems with increasing “distributed
generation” – is that you still need to interconnect with the
utilities. Yet the utilities view you as competition. So it’s hard
to get interconnection agreements. They come up with
ridiculous standby charges that make it uneconomic. We need
to think of utilities like the automobile industry: It takes a law
to make something happen. We didn’t get seat belts, pollution
control, or better mileage without laws.132
1. Net Metering
Net metering allows consumers who generate their
own renewable electricity on site to feed excess energy back
into the utility at times of excess capacity. This energy is credited
to their account by the utility and is used to offset power sold
to them at times when their demand outstrips their generation
capacity. Most states require utilities to offer a net metering
option to all their customers (commercial, industrial, and
residential), although the amount of distributed generating
capacity that is allowed to be connected is usually capped at no
more than 10-50 KW. Most net metering policies require that
any excess energy credits that have accrued at the end of the
year are granted back to the utility and not carried over for the
next year.133
2. Wind Easements and Access Laws
Wind easements and access laws allow those with
available wind resources on their land to protect that resource
from being obstructed or limited by projects or construction
on neighboring parcels of land. Nebraska and Montana allow
property owners to create wind easements that are conveyed
with the transfer of real property ownership. In Wisconsin
and Oregon, landowners may apply for special permits that
prevent others from obstructing wind resources available on
their land.134
IV. CASE STUDIES: STATE SNAPSHOTS
A. Texas: The Lone Star State Leading the Nation
Texas is fast becoming the nation’s leader in wind
energy development, installing over 915 MW in 2001 (21.5%
of the nation’s total installed wind generation to date.)135 Texas
has a combination of factors working in its favor. First, Texas
has great wind potential and many wide-open spaces. Texas
ranks 2nd in the nation behind North Dakota as the windiest
state, estimated to have the potential to produce 1,190 billion
kWh’s from wind energy alone.136 To put this in perspective,
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total electricity consumption throughout the country was 3,706
billion kWh’s in 1999.137
Second, the Texas legislature passed one of the most
far-reaching RPS in the country in 1999, mandating 400MW
of new renewables by 2003 and 2000MW by 2009.138 The
generation requirement mandates that electricity generators either
produce a percentage of the state mandate themselves or
purchase renewable energy credits to meet their requirement.
The size of the RPS targets has been credited with providing
long-term security to investors to finance large projects, thus
creating economies of scale that have allowed many of these
new facilities to deliver power at rates as cheap as $0.03/kWh.139
The law creating the state RPS was the result of years
of coordinated and sophisticated efforts by a coalition of
consumer, environmental, public health and religious groups.140
The first step towards victory came with the results of a series
of intensive polls taken by the state’s utilities. The results shocked
many in industry and government: 83% said that air pollution
was a serious or very serious problem; 76% said that they were
willing to pay $5 or more per month for non-polluting,
renewable energy; and 67% said that they wanted the Legislature
to require power producers to reduce pollution.141
The coalition followed this demonstration of public
support with a focused media campaign. They regularly
released reports highlighting the problems associated with
polluting energy and met with the editorial boards of the state’s
newspapers. The groups also worked to educate and organize
the grassroots and hired top-named lobbyists to take their case
to the highest levels of state policymaking.
The third factor contributing to the explosion in wind
development in Texas in 2001 was the fact that the 10-year,
$0.018/kWh federal production tax credit for wind was set to
expire at the end of the year. Unsure whether the tax credit
would be extended, many developers rushed to bring facilities
on-line. (The credit was extended in early 2002 for 2 years).
The fourth factor favoring wind energy in Texas is the
fact that its transmission infrastructure is entirely within state
regulatory jurisdiction. Unlike most of the rest of the country
that is interconnected interstate and therefore under the
regulatory authority of FERC, Texas oversees its own
transmission system – the Electric Reliability Council of Texas
(“ERCOT”). This has many short-term advantages allowing
the state to synchronize transmission access regulations with its
other mandates supporting renewable energy. For example,
the state mandated non-discriminatory open-access prices and
policies for wholesale generators as part of its electricity
restructuring legislation in 1999. They replaced the old access
fee which was calculated by the distance between the generator
and consumer with a “postage stamp” policy that charges a
flat fee to any generator accessing the transmission
infrastructure.142
In addition to fairer access fees for wholesale
generators in the state, ERCOT also adopted rules that allow
unplanned transmission access at a flat-rate of $0.15/MWH.143
This removes the concern over scheduling penalties that has
inhibited wind power in other parts of the country. The final
transmission policy favoring wind energy in Texas is the fact
that the cost of new transmission construction is paid for by
all users of the grid, not the particular generators who will rely
on the infrastructure expansions.
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The combination of great resource potential, a clear
RPS mandate and credit trading program, the availability of a
favorable production tax credit, and the adoption of nondiscriminatory transmission prices and policies have enabled
Texas to lead the nation in wind energy. By the end 2001,
Texas had already installed 915 MW of new wind power, more
than doubling the goal of 400 MW by the beginning of 2003
mandated under the state RPS.144
This new wind development has mainly occurred in
West Texas, across the state from most of the state’s load centers.
Although enough available transmission capacity has been
“mined” to enable these projects to come on line, the existing
transmission capacity has nearly reached its potential. In
response, ERCOT is developing plans to expand the
transmission system. Unfortunately, the timeframe for bringing
new wind facilities on-line is much shorter (12-18months) than
the time it will take to plan and construct the transmission lines
capable of delivering this power to market.145
B. Oregon & Washington: Shaping the Wind with Water
Wind power development has also progressed in the
Northwest. In April 2002, the largest wind farm in the
Northwest, the Stateline Project, began generating enough
power for more than 21,000 homes.146 That same month, the
world’s largest wind turbine manufacturer, Vestas, announced
plans to construct its largest manufacturing plant in Portland,
OR.147 Despite signs of progress, however, many obstacles
continue to impede wind power development in the Northwest.
From early 2000 to mid-2001, skyrocketing wholesale
energy prices and severe energy shortages in California and the
Northwest made wind energy a comparatively cheaper option,
thus overshadowing many of these obstacles. In an effort to
stabilize wholesale supply and prices the Bonneville Power
Administration (BPA) issued a request for proposals for at
least 1000MW of new wind power. The response to the RFP
was tremendous, with 25 proposals totaling over 2600 MW.148
Unfortunately, as wholesale energy prices began to drop, so
did BPA’s interest in many of these new wind projects. From
the original seven projects selected in July 2001 totaling 830
MW, three have been withdrawn by the developers. Although
BPA still plans to go forward with remaining 4 projects
(430MW), it is doing so on a relaxed timeframe.149
As recent events illustrate, the growth of wind energy
in the Northwest is extremely dependant on the policies and
initiative of the BPA. BPA owns and or controls about 75%
of the high-voltage transmission grid in the Pacific Northwest,
providing service throughout Oregon, Washington, Idaho,
Western Montana, and small portions of several other states.150
Federal subsidies have enabled the BPA to deliver power to its
customers at some of the cheapest rates in the country. Without
a proactive commitment by the BPA to wind power that will
not vacillate with short-term energy prices, wind energy growth
could be extremely difficult in the region. Importantly, none
of the states that serve as BPA’s primary service territory have
mandated Renewable Portfolio Standards that require utilities
to deliver a percentage of renewable power. As a result,
Northwest utilities and the BPA are under much less pressure
to expedite the process of removing the obstacles that inhibit
widespread wind power development.
Nonetheless, BPA and others in the region continue to
advance a process that addresses and removes many of the
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barriers. Their two greatest concerns are the total cost and
power system impacts of additional wind resources.151
BPA’s Generation Imbalance Service Rate has, like many
other transmission policies throughout the country, severely
limited wind’s potential. The existing rules impose a penalty
on power generators if delivery deviates more than 1.5% or
2MW (whichever is greater) from the schedule. The penalty,
$100/MWh is the difference between commercial viability for
many wind operations. Under pressure from renewable energy
advocates, BPA recently decided to exempt wind producers
from the imbalance penalty. In place of the penalty, wind
generators will only have to reimburse BPA for its costs in
balancing the intermittency of wind power within the power
grid.152 BPA explained that the exemption for wind was
necessary because “wind generation resources are not able to
accurately predict their generation output to avoid application
of the penalty rate…so they are not able to respond to the rate
as an incentive to accurately schedule generation output.”153
In addition to efforts by BPA, the state of Oregon has
also implemented policies to encourage renewable energy. As
part of its electric restructuring law, Oregon established a 3%
public benefits charge on customers of the state’s two largest
utilities. The fund is being managed by the Energy Trust of
Oregon and will go towards promoting energy efficiency and
renewable projects. The newly formed Trust has set ambitious
goals of reducing energy use by 300MW by 2012 and increasing
the percentage of renewable energy to 15% by that date.154
C. Minnesota: Encouraging Small and Large Scale Wind
Projects
Minnesota is the 9th windiest state in the country and
currently ranks 4th in installed wind capacity with 320MW.155
Most of the growth can be attributed to a 1997 compromise
with the owners of the Prairie Island nuclear facility requiring
them to invest in renewables in exchange for allowances to
store more nuclear waste on site. The mandate required 425MW
of wind by 2002 and an additional 400MW by 2013.156 XCEL
energy, the current owner of Prairie Island, has already installed
or contracted out more than enough wind power to meet the
2002 deadline.157
In 2001, the state enacted a Renewable Energy
Objective (“REO”) and a mandatory green pricing program.158
The REO is like a voluntary RPS that sets a goal of producing
10% of the state’s energy from renewables by 2015. To meet
the objective, MN would have to install roughly 3400MW of
new renewables by that date.159
The REO is non-binding and only requires that utilities
make a “good-faith” effort to meet the goal.160 Despite efforts
by a coalition of environmental and consumer activists to adopt
a mandatory RPS, utilities and other opponents defeated the
proposal. The opponents instead pushed for green pricing
programs that rely on consumer preference in order to drive
new renewable development in the state. Unfortunately, this is
likely to have a much more limited impact than a RPS would
have.
Minnesota has been as active as any state in the country
at promoting small-scale (less than 2MW) wind project
development. It is currently the only state to have a Renewable
Production Incentive that pays eligible developers $0.015/kWh.
This is on top of the Federal Production Tax Credit that may
also be available for such projects. Qualifying facilities include
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small businesses, tribal councils, non-profit corporations, or
private projects that are owned and operated by the
landowner.161
In addition to the production payment, small facilities
also benefit from a standardized interconnection agreement
and tariff. Unlike many other small wind developers throughout
the country, developers in Minnesota do not have to negotiate
unique agreements with utilities each time they want to connect
to the grid. Instead, upon request, they are presented with a
boilerplate agreement that they or their lawyers can easily review
before signing. The agreement is simple and the interconnection
fees are reasonably calculated.
D. California: Returning to its Roots
California gave birth to the modern wind energy
industry in the early 1980’s in response to the energy crisis of
the prior decade. A combination of high long-term energy
prices, generous fiscal incentives, and other aggressive state
policies and programs helped to create an atmosphere that
was ripe for adoption of the technology.
In addition to fiscal incentives for renewables,
California also aggressively pursued increased renewable
development in other ways.
Under pressure from
environmental groups and then Governor Jerry Brown, the
state’s Public Utilities Commission pressured the three largest
utilities to implement recent changes in federal law requiring
monopoly utilities to purchase power from independently
owned renewable energy plants.162 The purchases were made
through long-term contracts based on anticipated avoided costs
of power, which were projected to be higher than they actually
turned out to be.163
The California Public Utilities Commission also helped
to develop standard power purchase contracts (“standard offer
contracts”). These standard contracts simplified the process
of connecting to the grid and ensured reasonable charges for
interconnection.164
This combination of policies, programs and incentives
led to an average growth of over 64% in wind energy
production in California from 1983 to 1994.165 Unfortunately,
this impressive growth skidded to a sudden halt in the mid1990’s due to the expiration of favorable long-term contracts.
Energy prices for natural gas and petroleum had fallen and
were at levels unanticipated when many of the contracts were
originally signed. As a result, the utilities’ avoided costs also
fell, meaning that long-term contracts being offered to
independent wind energy producers were significantly lower
than a decade earlier.
In 1996, California passed sweeping electricity
deregulation legislation that promised competitive markets,
cheaper rates, and consumer choice. Unfortunately, none of
these promises were fulfilled. Instead, the stage was set for
unprecedented wholesale price manipulation that led to
skyrocketing wholesale energy prices that ultimately bankrupted
one of the State’s largest utilities. The ensuing energy crisis and
the State’s concern over meeting energy demand led Governor
Davis to sign extremely expensive long-term energy contracts.
Efforts are underway to re-negotiate these contracts with the
State claiming that they should be invalidated because they were
under duress when they signed them.
Despite these serious obstacles to renewable energy
facing the state, the state has implemented several far-reaching
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programs to promote the technology. Whether these programs
are enough to overcome the obstacles is unclear.
Along with the 1996 deregulation, the State created
several programs supporting renewable energy and other
programs. The Public Interest Energy Research Program
(PIER) annually awards up to $62 million for a variety of
programs related to bringing environmentally safe and
affordable energy technologies to the marketplace.166
The second program was the creation of the largest
Public Benefits Fund in the country. The funds are collected
from a fee on energy users throughout the state and are allocated
to several different accounts. The New and Existing Renewable
Resource Accounts provide qualifying projects with a
production payment of up to $0.015 kWh.167 For residential
and small business customers, the state has established a BuyDown program that will pay $4,500 per kW or 50% of the
project (whichever is less) for wind turbines under 10 kW.168
The State’s Renewables Program also allocated funds
to help develop green markets, although these programs have
been suspended since September 2001, when the state
suspended customer choice in response to the problems related
to its flawed deregulation process.
Perhaps most significantly, on September 12, 2002,
California adopted the most ambitious renewable portfolio
standard in the country, requiring the state’s utilities to produce
at least 20% of their electricity from renewables by 2017.169
Based upon the effectiveness of RPS policies in other states
and California’s pioneering experience with wind energy, the
future of wind energy development in the state looks bright.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Leveling the Playing Field
1. Long-Term Initiatives
If the environmental costs of energy were reflected in
the price rather than externalized, then wind energy would
become a more economical option. The best way to
accomplish this is by the elimination of disproportionately
allocated subsidies and by shifting the tax burden to internalize
environmental costs on the polluter. Phase out all energy
subsidies over an extended period of time. This would allow
companies and markets to slowly transition to reliance on the
cheapest energy sources.
The most economically sound way to help promote
more environmentally benign energy sources like wind is
through comprehensive tax shifting. This would involve shifting
the tax burden on society away from things that are beneficial,
such as work and capital investment, and onto things that are
detrimental, such as pollution and other unsustainable practices.
This rewards those things that we want to encourage and
penalizes those things that we want to discourage.
One way to accomplish this within the energy sector is
to implement a carbon tax. The tax would add cost to every
unit (BTU) of carbon consumed. Because wind and other
non-polluting energy sources, consume no carbon, they would
escape the tax altogether.
2. Short-Term Proposals
Comprehensive tax shifting and the elimination of all
energy subsidies is not a realistic short-term goal due to the
enormous political opposition garnered by these proposals.
Fortunately, there are many short-term proposals that can
realistically be pursued. They include:
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♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

Extending the Renewable Energy Production Tax
Credit indefinitely.
Shifting energy subsidies away from fossil fuels and
nuclear power towards renewables and energy
efficiency.
Creating a national RPS and national REC trading
system modeled on successful state programs.
Creating state RPS and REC programs in all 50 states.
This would encourage renewable energy development
more evenly throughout the country.
Mandating federal, state, and local government
purchases of renewable energy.
Extending and harmonizing state tax credits and
exemptions.

B. Helping Wind Get Grid Connected
The new “open-access” era must begin living up to its
name. Despite FERC proclamations in support of nondiscriminatory access to the grid for wind and other renewable
energy, many policies continue to restrict fair access.
1. Reforming or Replacing FERC
Reforming or replacing FERC’s oversight of the
interstate transmission system is central to the process of
eliminating many of these obstacles. Such reforms should
include the following:
♦
Authorizing FERC to issue meaningful penalties for
non-compliance with its Orders.
♦
Consolidating the regulatory authority over transmission
policy within the Bonneville Power Administration, the
Tennessee Valley Authority, and those transmission
organizations currently under FERC’s jurisdiction.
♦
Mandating uniform transmission policy throughout the
country regarding connecting wind energy to the grid.
♦
Requiring that consumer and environmental concerns
are fairly represented within the decision-making bodies
of Regional Transmission Organizations and
Independent Service Operators.
2. Adopting Non-Discriminatory Scheduling
Policies
In addition to reforming or replacing FERC, the
following policies should be adopted by the country’s various
Transmission Operators:
♦
Eliminating scheduling penalties for intermittent energy
generators.
♦
Allowing real-time balancing markets that settle
payments or charges related to scheduling deviations
based on real-time prices at the time of the deviation.
♦
Implementing a system for conducting and
disseminating wind forecasting information to reduce
scheduling deviations.
♦
Promoting geographical aggregation of wind facilities
to help create a more reliable wholesale power
product.

♦

3. Adopting Equitable Interconnection Fees
Basing the interconnection fee on monthly or annual
average usage rather than on a facilities nameplate (peak)
capacity.
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♦
♦

♦

Standardizing and simplifying interconnection
agreements and fees for small wind producers.
Financing maintenance (embedded costs) and
expansion of the transmission grid by fees paid by
electricity consumers rather than by charges to energy
generators.
Adopting a “postage stamp” fee that charges a fixed
interconnection fee regardless of how many
transmission systems are used to deliver power to the
end user.
4. Increasing Transmission Capacity Available
for Wind

♦
♦
♦

Upgrading the transmission infrastructure to reduce
thermal and voltage operating constraints.
Replacing antiquated mechanical switches with a new
integrated fiber-optic network.
Ensuring that wind projects are fairly represented in
decisions to expand the transmission infrastructure.

CONCLUSION
Electricity consumption has grown by 23.5% over the
last decade in the U.S. with a continual over-reliance on fossil
fuel and nuclear energy sources.170 Our understanding of the
causes and effects of climate change and other environmental
consequences has also grown. Wind energy and other
renewables, along with increased conservation and efficiency
programs, could enable us to respond to these growing
problems while also providing energy security for future
generations.
Although quite possible, transitioning to a clean,
renewable energy economy will not be easy. To date, a
combination of innovative policymaking and entrepreneurial
creativity has enabled wind energy to begin competing with
traditional sources of energy in the commercial marketplace.
Yet there remains an enormous untapped potential for wind
energy in the U.S., one that will remain largely untapped without
the introduction of more aggressive and consistent policies
throughout the country.
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NEWS UPDATE
Multilateral Environmental
Agreements & World
Trade
By Melanie Nakagawa*
n September 2003, the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) will meet in Cancun,
Mexico. Cancun may provide an opportunity to reconcile
many tensions between trade and the environment, although it
seems likely that environmental concerns will remain
marginalized. NGOs, governments, and other environmental
agencies are eagerly waiting to see what happens at Cancun.
At the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha,
Qatar, governments mandated the WTO to unilaterally clarify
the relationship between trade rules and trade measures that
enforce MEAs. The Doha mandate, however, established that
the outcome of any negotiations “shall not diminish the rights
and obligations of Members under existing WTO agreements,”
thus continuing to subjugate environmental concerns to those
of trade.1 Many developing nations favor prioritizing economic
development over complying with MEAs. They consider
GATT Article XX, the list of exceptions, adequate for handling
the MEA-WTO issue.2 Other nations, mainly developed
economic powers, support clarifying the MEA-WTO
relationship.3
Two areas of potential progress are increased
cooperation and information exchange, and laying out the legal
framework for the relationship between MEAs and trade
agreements. A major limiting factor, however, is the fact that
the negotiations leading up to Cancun have largely excluded
many environmental perspectives from the discussion. Currently
the WTOs Committee on Trade and Environment meets with
secretariats of MEAs once or twice a year to discuss traderelated provisions and dispute resolution mechanisms in MEAs.4
Thus, new negotiations could expand the existing cooperation
between the WTO and trade-related MEAs.5

I

(Endnotes)
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PRACTITIONER’S CORNER
A Conversation With NRDC’s Greg
Wetstone
Interviewed by Dave Newman
reg Westsone is the Director of Programs for the
Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”) and
has been with NRDC since 1995. Before that he worked
for Representative Henry Waxman, a California congressman.

G

SDLP: What does NRDC do?
Wetstone: We play a key role in the effort to grapple with our
most serious environmental challenges. These days we are
spending a lot of time trying to hold onto the very important
bedrock structure that has worked since 1970. NRDC played
a huge role in getting these laws into the books and now we
are fighting like hell to hold onto them.
SDLP: EPA just released a state of the environment report
which basically hails many of the victories of the last 30 years
and attributes much of that success to the nation’s environmental
laws. It seems quite ironic that the Bush Administration
simultaneously praises the efficacy of the nation’s environmental
laws as it works to weaken them. Are you surprised that there’s
not more of a backlash against Administration’s environmental
policies?
Wetstone: I think there will be. I think there has been. I think
we’re living in a time where the Administration is relying largely
on distraction and almost recognizes that they have almost no
real ability to make a public case with any sort of credible
detail. I think there is right now a very systematic effort to try
to undermine the very infrastructure that makes these laws work
and it’s a brazen disregard for science and a brazen disregard
for law and a brazen disregard for public opinion. I think the
truth will come out. History shows that these things tend to be
cyclical and public attention will turn inward as I think it already
has.
SDLP: One of the surprising things post 9-11 was the lack
of discussion around the connection between our foreign policy
and our dependence on unsustainable forms of energy. Do
you see a more coherent foreign policy that incorporates
environmental sustainability as one of the key components?
Do you see that articulated in any context across the political
social spectrum? Do you hear anyone speaking about that?
Wetstone: I think that there are a lot of people who are
speaking to the importance of the connection between
sustainable energy policy and national security because by
SUMMER/FALL 2003

reducing our reliance on unstable regions of the world for
energy, we are also reducing our reliance on an energy path
that leads us to greater pollution, greater global warming - and
that is not something we can sustain over the long term if we
want to protect the planet’s climate. You could point to John
Kerry, Joe Lieberman, John McCain in the Senate. Henry
Waxman and Sherry Boehlert in the House. A number of
champions of provisions that reduce reliance on foreign oil
over time. I think the country after 9-11 was looking to the
President for leadership and had the President been willing to
show leadership, to ask for sacrifice, to urge Americans to
reduce reliance on imported oil, to take that provision to
Congress, I think we’d have a law today that would help with
these problems. Unfortunately, where we have been is a very
different place, where, in many ways, the financial rewards for
oil companies has been a more important factor than the long
term public interest in either environment or security.
SDLP: Some people have said that 9-11 created an incredible
moment and an opportunity to create a sea change in our nation’s
energy policy. Do you think there is still an opportunity to
make those kind of grand sweeping changes and pull the country
along from this point?
Wetstone: Yeah, I do. I think that we need leadership that
shares the objective of reducing our reliance on foreign oil and
I think that it is clear that there is a high price to pay including in
human life for continuing to bolster instead of reduce our
reliance on foreign oil. In the long term, if we want to leave a
planet to our children that’s better than the one we came into,
we’ve got some work to do and this is an important part of it.
SDLP: On the domestic front, with all of the attacks that we
are currently seeing on environmental laws and regulations, is it
hard to keep moving forward trying to build upon the
environmental successes of the past 30 years while you are
playing such a defensive role?
Wetstone: That’s one of the great tragedies of the time we’re
in. While it has never been more important to be moving
forward, we are forced to devote tremendous attention and
resources simply to keep from moving backward on programs
that are broadly popular and broadly successful and that we
should be building on. Instead we see constant efforts to
undermine these programs. It is hard to keep moving forward,
but we are looking at other places. For example, we have
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legislation in California on motor vehicles’ contribution to global
warming that’s very important. We are looking for opportunities
to change the dynamic and elevate this as an issue and really get
focused on how to make progress.
SDLP: If you were a member of Congress, what would be
the first piece of legislation that you would introduce?
Wetstone: I have the continual opportunity to work with
members of Congress to get the kind of legislation that we
need. We have good legislation in Congress, it just doesn’t go
anywhere. The issue is really the leadership in Congress and
the leadership in the White House. We need the ability to move
us forward on these issues. Drafting the bill and getting it out
there isn’t the hard part.
SDLP: How do you see the tactics used by most environmental
organizations like NRDC evolving in the future to meet the
growing opposition and sophistication of the tools used by
the opposition?

that devalue the lives of senior citizens, we see proposals that
only look to the lost value in monetary terms and don’t consider
quality of life, don’t consider what it’s worth to protect
wilderness, to have a clear day, what’s it worth to have a bald
eagle.
The problem with these theories is that they put you in a
structure that can easily be manipulated and we have a system
that has dramatically improved our quality of life, as EPA’s
Report seeks to document, in reducing the pollution in our
cities, cleaning up our rivers, protecting animals on the verge
of extinction, protecting the ozone layer. All of which, by the
way, is at risk by proposals moving in the current Administration.
We have a structure that has basically worked and we should
build on it, rather than tear it down. That’s the problem, we’re
looking to tear down the foundation that we should be building
on, and when we build on that foundation, we can do it in
economically efficient ways.

Wetstone: I think we’re doing a much better job than we ever
had with the resources that we have. I think we’re being more
strategic, that we’re relying on new tools that are bring us along.
The Internet and the tremendous network of activists that we’ve
developed in the last 5 years is something that we didn’t have.
More sophisticated message development and that kind of
thing and much better collaboration amongst groups, but we’re
facing a lot more money, more than we ever have. I think the
foxes have taken over the henhouse. We have people running
the White House and running the Congress who are basically
willing to do precisely the bidding of not just corporate
polluters, but the absolute least responsible, worst elements on
every issue, be it logging, air pollution, or global warming.
That’s the problem.
SDLP: Many economics have argued that we could do away
with a lot of the regulation if we simply internalized the external
costs of pollution into the costs of goods and services that we
use. We have seen some encouraging results in some very limited
cases that have taken this approach. But how do you popularize
such a complex kind of explanation for raising prices on goods
and services?
Wetstone: I think it becomes an academic discussion. Yes, it
would be a more efficient system if we could internalize the
costs, but what is the true cost? How much is a clear day
worth? How much is it worth for your child to not have
asthma? Where we have this kind of economic analysis playing
a role we see tremendous data manipulation. We see that now
at the White House, where their efforts to promote approaches
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ARTICLE
THE CHICAGO CLIMATE EXCHANGE:

CAN GREENHOUSE GASES BE REDUCED ABSENT GOVERNMENT
MANDATES?
By Angie Farleigh *

The Chicago Climate Exchange (“CCX”) is a voluntary tradable
permit program for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The
program includes voluntary emissions reductions and trading
for all six greenhouse gases. Trading in carbon dioxide is
expected to generate the most interest. Member companies
make a legally binding agreement to reduce their emissions of
greenhouse gases by 4% below the average of their 1998-2001
emissions by 2006.1 This figure was reached during the design
phase, through consensus among the founding member
companies. It was a goal that all of the companies felt they
could reach, but CCX representatives note that it is possible
this number will change once the program is up and running.2
It is unclear whether this was a reduction that many of the
companies were going to achieve through other means,
regardless of their participation in the CCX.
CCX was initially funded by a $347,600 Joyce
foundation grant, administered by the Kellogg Graduate School
of Management at Northwestern University. Environmental
Financial Products, LLC performed the principle research for
the study. The exchange will be regulated by the National
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) and N.M.
Rothschild & Son Ltd. will provide investment banking services.
Program Structure
The program is presumably modeled after the U.S.
acid rain (“SO2”) trading program which CCX Chairman and
CEO, Richard L. Sandor, helped design. Participants can receive
credits by reducing emissions, or generate “offset” credits by
engaging in offset projects.3 The market would consist of
tradable commodities, in the form of a ton of carbon dioxide
equivalent that could be bought and sold like shares of stock.4
The participants will use a web-based system regulated by the
NASD to buy and sell the credits.5 Each participating company
will have an account on the CCX registry containing tradable
emission allowances based on the 1% per year reduction goals.
Members will use the website to exchange bids and offers, but
will not know counterparties’ identities until trades clear.6 Any
member that achieves greater reductions than the stated goal
would be granted a credit slip, which could be traded to
companies that did not meet their goals. A participating
company must surrender one allowance or offset for every
ton of CO2 emitted over its limit.
The exchange will be available to greenhouse gas
emission sources, farm and forest carbon sinks, offset projects
and liquidity providers in the United States, as well as to offset
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providers in Brazil. Emission sources and offset projects in
Canada and Mexico will also be integrated into the program
after trading begins.7 The advisory board hopes to eventually
expand the program to include other international sources.
The program will be run principally by the CCX Board of
Directors, assisted by a small CCX staff. Richard Sandor will
serve as CCX’s CEO and Chairman.8 Maurice Strong, former
Chairman of the Earth Council, a Canadian NGO, will serve
as a Vice-Chairman of CCX.9 Mr. Strong is also the former
Under-Secretary General of the United Nations responsible
for the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The other
Vice-Chairman of the exchange will be Les Rosenthal, a
principal of the Chicago-based commodities and futures
trading firm, Rosenthal Collins.10 Mr. Rosenthal is a former
Chairman of the Chicago Board of Trade. Finally, former
Illinois Governor James R. Thompson, current Chairman of
Winston and Strawn, will serve as Director of CCX.11
CCX will also have a “high level” advisory board
consisting of a mixture of academics, scientists, policy experts,
and industry representatives.12 The role of the advisory board
is to provide “input as needed.”13 As the name suggests, their
function will be to give advice and not to participate in the
decision-making process.
Program Governance
In order to be a member of CCX, participants must
sign a contract promising to meet the stated emissions reductions
and to trade only on the CCX exchange for the four-year pilot
period.14 Like other commodity exchanges, the NASD will
look to verify reductions and has worked with the CCX to
devise compliance procedures for the program.15 The NASD
will be in charge of enforcing the caps and ensuring that the
credits traded in the exchange represent real, permanent
emissions reductions.16 To accomplish this goal, CCX and the
NASD have based much of the verification system on the
Greenhouse Gas Protocol Initiative (“GHG Protocol”), which
was developed by the World Resources Institute in 1998 in
order to standardize and legitimize GHG emissions from
companies around the world.17 The GHG Protocol helps
companies calculate and report their GHG emissions by
providing standards for accounting, setting reporting boundaries
for the company, setting baseline emissions levels and reporting
the emissions data.18 It also provides guidance to companies
on calculating GHG emissions, managing their inventory quality
23

and verifying their GHG emissions data.19 The GHG protocol
includes calculation tools that represent a “best practice” for
emissions calculation.20 In order to calculate its GHG emissions,
a company must input data on its activities into an Excel
spreadsheet and then select the appropriate emissions factors,
based on the Protocol’s step-by-step guidance. Emission factors
and calculation methods vary depending on the type of GHG,
the type of industry, and other site-specific activity data.21
The GHG Protocol, although helpful in designing a
verification system, was not a perfect fit for a trading program
like CCX.22 CCX is in the final stages of developing a new
protocol23 that will be approximately eighty percent based on
the GHG Protocol, and about twenty percent “custom fit” to
the needs of the program and its members.24 The result will
be a standardized emission submission protocol that all
members of the CCX must follow in order to participate in
the exchange. Standardizing the data that is submitted to the
CCX will ensure that all members are held to the same standard
and will make it easier for the NASD to audit the submissions.
Most of the initial member companies are large multinational
corporations that have already been tracking their GHG
emissions since 1990, either through the GHG Protocol or
some other comparable means. 25 All of the companies
participating in the CCX pilot program already have emissions
inventories built up and will be able to meet the new CCX
emission submission standards. Because CCX is still in the
pilot phase, officials have yet to develop procedures for smaller
companies that may want to join in the future, but do not have
the systems in place to meet the CCX rules.26
Once the protocol is in place, the NASD will verify
compliance with the rules by auditing each of the member
companies. 27 Auditors from the NASD will look at the
underlying data and documents that support the baseline and
emission numbers that the companies submit to the CCX.
These documents will include invoices, deliveries, receipts and
any other paperwork that the company used to establish its
baseline number and emissions.28
The NASD will also use its market surveillance
technologies to monitor trading activity for fraud and
manipulation.29 CCX is the final arbiter of the treatment of
the submitted data, not the NASD.30 The NASD scores the
submissions for accuracy and reports its findings to the CCX.
Any violations, whether through fraud or negligence, will be
policed by peer review under the same kind of enforcement
provisions for defaults on the stock exchanges.31 Companies
that fail to meet their commitments may face sanctions. Sandor
says he expects peer review to be effective and does not
anticipate the kind of market manipulation that has occurred
in the energy markets.32 Apparently, NASD officials share
Sandor’s faith in the honesty of the CCX members. One NASD
representative stated that, although there is always a risk of
falsifying documents, because most of the members of CCX
are huge corporations, they didn’t have to worry about fraud
as much as they would with smaller businesses.33
The Current Market for CCX Credits
Like other commodities, the buyers and sellers will
determine the price of the credits. Trading is expected to have
begun early in the summer of 2003. A few companies have
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already conducted a handful of bilateral trades for greenhouse
gas emissions. CCX says that carbon trades have already
surpassed $100 million, and, with the start of CCX, annual
trading could increase to the tens of billions.34
Most of the participants seem to be companies who
have experience with other pollution exchanges, either abroad35
or with the U.S. SO 2 trade allowances. Some of these
companies hope that participating in the CCX will allow them
to learn better ways to meet mandates abroad.36
One of the purposes of the exchange is to allow
companies that are subject to mandatory emissions reductions
in other jurisdictions, to take credit for the reductions made in
the United States. To this end, the designers of CCX will
create a registry of reductions claimed by each participant. They
hope to make the registry sufficiently accurate/adequate to gain
international credibility? a high enough quality that other programs
in other countries will accept it.37 However, acceptance will
still be on a case-by-case basis.
For the immediate future, the program’s pollution
credits will only be valid in parts of the U.S., Canada, Mexico38
and, to a limited extent, Brazil.39 None of these countries have
mandatory GHG programs.
Incentives to Participate
There are currently no mandatory Federal laws
requiring companies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
This raises the question of why the CCX members are
participating in the program in the absence of a legal requirement
to do so. There are several possible reasons. Companies may
hope to develop a “green” reputation among stockholders
and the general public (i.e. potential stockholders). Additionally,
they may hope to reduce operating costs by reducing energy
costs and raising productivity.
The most likely reason is that companies may want to
get a head start in anticipation of any mandatory emissions
programs that the Bush Administration may implement.
Participation in the CCX, will not only reduce long-term costs
of controlling emissions, but it will also build the members’
GHG management and trading skills thus putting them in a
position to shape future policy debate.40 CCX companies will
also have strong grounds to ask U.S. lawmakers to recognize
emissions credits retroactively in the event that mandatory
reductions are ever implemented.41
Additionally, many multinational corporations might
want to get involved in this program because they may already
be feeling the effects of the Kyoto Protocol even though the
U.S. has not adopted it. In today’s global society, corporations
are increasingly interacting in foreign jurisdictions and are subject
to the laws of those jurisdictions, namely the provisions set
forth in the Kyoto Protocol.42 Therefore, many U.S.-based
companies that are forced to reduce GHGs in a foreign
jurisdiction could either buy additional credits in the foreign
jurisdiction, or decrease production in the foreign jurisdiction
or in the U.S.43
However, the much-touted perks of the program may
not be beneficial to all companies. For instance, TXU Corp.
was one of the companies that participated in the design of
the program, but has since decided not to participate in the
trading because it was not sure if it would be financially
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beneficial.44
Evaluating the Effectiveness of the CCX Program
A.

The General Theory of Tradable Permit
Systems

There are two types of tradable permit systems. First,
there is the cap-and-trade program where a total resource access
limit is defined and then allocated among users. This is
commonly thought to be the most effective program because
the fixed upper limits guarantee that, even if there is an increase
in pollution sources, there will not be an increase in pollution.45
The second type of program is the tradable credit program,
which establishes an individual baseline for each user, usually
based on an existing technology-based standard.46 This type
of program is less effective because it only establishes a limit
for each source of pollution without setting an overall limit.47
Therefore, more sources can mean more pollution. CCX is
more similar to a tradable credit program because each
participating company has pledged to reduce their GHG
emissions 4% below their original baseline. This approach
makes the most sense given that CCX involves only a small
percentage of the total U.S. emission sources. A cap and trade
program would be more reasonable if the responsibility for
meeting an overall GHG limit were divided amongst all sources
in the U.S. Regardless of the type of system, because no emission
source in the U.S. is currently required to reduce GHG emissions,
any participation in voluntary programs such as CCX will result
in increased environmental protection.
In theory, a tradable permit system can be an effective
approach to dealing with many environmental problems.
Market driven policies are advantageous because they can
internalize the costs of compliance and lower the costs for
governments.48 In a perfectly competitive market, the permits
or credits will flow toward their highest value. 49 A system
such as CCX can optimize the value of the target resource—in
this case, the resource would be a GHG-free atmosphere. Such
permit systems will not achieve this goal if the market conditions
are not right.50 For instance, the system needs to be designed
to minimize the possibilities for market power and the presence
of high transaction costs or large uninternalized externalities.51
Furthermore, without government involvement there must be
a reliable system of private sector independent audits and
verification procedures in place.52
In a report by the National Academies of Science entitled,
The Drama of the Commons, Professor Elinor Ostrom
recommends several factors by which to assess the effectiveness
of such a system.53 Ostrom suggests analyzing the feasibility
of implementing the system, evaluating the environmental
effects on the resource as well as other affected resources, and
considering the economic effects on the regulated industry and
those who use the resource.54
B.

Implementation Feasibility

No matter how lofty the goals of a trading program
may be, it will not accomplish anything if it is not feasible to
implement. To determine implementation feasibility, one must
first analyze the method by which the resource is allocated
SUMMER/FALL 2003

among the users. For instance, some systems use a “first come,
first served” approach, while some allocate permits randomly
like a lottery.55 The most common method of allocating access
rights is a method known as “grandfathering.” Grandfathering
bases the initial allocation on historic emissions so that existing
sources only have to purchase any additional credits they may
need over and above the initial allocation.56 Because the costs
of implementing a tradable permits system are typically large,
the grandfathering approach has commonly been a necessary
ingredient in building the political support necessary to
implement the system.57 Accordingly, the CCX system allocates
an emissions amount equal to 4% below historic emissions
levels to participating companies. If they do not meet that 4%
goal, they will have to purchase credits that will bring their
emissions levels down to the 4% allocation.
The second factor in analyzing implementation
feasibility is whether a system has sufficient monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms. Insufficient monitoring and
enforcement can lead to increased emissions because the
aggregate limit could be breached, either on accident or
purposely.58 In order to increase compliance, many members
of the academic community feel it is important that the regulated
community have a substantial role in the “co-management” of
environmental resources.59 Some argue this is because the
government is not efficient at verifying and monitoring such
systems and should, therefore, let the private sector implement
the system once the government has set the rules.60 Despite
their arguments, the most common form of governance in
the U.S. today is a system of top-down management where
the regulated community plays a small role.61 CCX, on the
other hand, has no government input whatsoever and is run
solely by “the regulated community.” Although CCX has an
advisory board of non-industry representatives, it has no
decision-making power. This raises obvious concerns over
the credibility of the monitoring and enforcement of the CCX.
It is unclear what incentives the designers of CCX have to
ensure that the system is properly monitored and enforced
and is otherwise free from fraudulent activities. The most likely
incentive is that, if the CCX program is sufficiently credible,
participants will be able to trade their credits on exchanges in
foreign jurisdictions, or they can receive credit for them if the
U.S. ever adopts mandatory GHG reductions.
Assuming CCX designers wanted to ensure sufficient
monitoring and enforcement, they would first need to ensure
there was a proper monitoring system in place. Every successful
monitoring system must be able to identify the data needed to
monitor the trading and operations of the program, but also
gather, interpret and act on this information.62 The monitoring
system for CCX was designed partly by experienced staff at
the NASD, and was based in part on the widely-accepted GHG
Protocol. It will also utilize the NASD’s state-of-the-art market
surveillance technologies. Assuming that the final CCX
emissions submission protocol does not differ too much from
the GHG Protocol, it seems that CCX has an adequate system
in place to properly monitor the program. However, another
important component in a sufficient monitoring system is to
have an integrated computer system where all users can access
the trading system on a real-time basis.63 The CCX will operate
on a web-based system which will make monitoring easier.
However, the system will only be open to registered members
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of the exchange. The only information that will be publicly
available on the website will be the price of the credits and
other “nonproprietary” information.64 This creates a weakness
in the monitoring system as the companies are not under any
public pressure to report accurate information. Public scrutiny
is especially crucial in this case because it seems that both CCX
and the NASD have placed a lot of trust in the honesty of
these companies to report accurately. This seems unreasonable
after such recent scandals as Enron and WorldCom.
The most problematic element of the CCX program
is its enforcement mechanism. Even if the monitoring system
was fail-proof and caught every mistake and deception, it is
still unclear how the rules will be enforced. Member companies
must sign a contract promising to abide by the rules, and may
face sanctions if they violate the contract. It is unclear if these
sanctions will ever be imposed. Even if the NASD finds that
a company has purposely submitted false data, the final arbiter
is the CCX itself. It is unclear how lenient the CCX will be on
defaulting members.
C.

Environmental Effects

In order to be effective, a tradable permit system must
start by defining a sustainable target.65 This target might not
necessarily be efficient for many of the effected pollution
sources. In many cases, it provides the only opportunity to
achieve an environmentally beneficial outcome. The CCX
members agreed to reduce their GHG emissions to 4% below
the average of their 1998-2001 emissions. This is a modest
goal considering that the framers of the Kyoto Protocol agreed
that the world’s emission sources would need to reduce their
GHG emissions by at least 7% below 1990 levels if there was
any hope of curbing global warming.66 The few members of
the CCX, with their modest 4% goal, are not likely to reduce
the world’s GHG emissions to a “sustainable” level. If run
properly, the program can still produce positive environmental
results.
Carbon dioxide and other GHGs are arguably the
best pollutants for a credit trading program such as CCX.67
Carbon dioxide is not toxic so it does not endanger the health
of local communities if an emission source chooses to buy
credits to emit more CO2 at a specific plant. Furthermore,
reductions made at local sources can make a difference
worldwide. Even though the CCX is currently localized to a
few companies, mostly in the U.S., any reductions that result
from the exchange will have a positive effect on reducing global
warming.
Trading programs such as CCX also give flexibility to
companies on how they propose to meet their reduction goals.
This flexibility makes it more likely that participants will actually
meet their goal.68 However, there is always the danger of
uninternalized externalities, like protecting one resource at the
expense of another. 69 For example, CCX would not be
environmentally beneficial if the companies chose to reduce
their GHG emissions by installing technologies that caused them
to increase their nitrogen oxide emissions. However, this is
unlikely in such a program because climate change programs
tend to result in reductions of other pollutants as a side effect.70
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D.

Economic Effects

In evaluating the effectiveness of a pollution prevention
program, one must also evaluate the economic effects of the
program. For the regulated industry (or in this case, the
participating companies), there is a risk that the program will
involve high transaction costs, making voluntary participation
unlikely. Tradable permit programs, if adequately enforced,
tend to “increase the value of the commons to which the
permits apply.”71 Thus air pollution programs such as the CCX
will probably make it cheaper to meet the pollution control
targets.72
There is also the possibility that such a program can
become too economically beneficial for some sources, creating
market power in a few companies.73 The fact that the credits
are transferable allows the opportunity for some groups to
accumulate permits and to use them to gain economic power
in other markets. Typically, other programs have protections
against such activities and may put a limit on the amount of
credits one source can accumulate.74 Such programs are also
typically reviewed by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to
check for possible antitrust violations.75 The CCX does not
have any such limit on credit accumulation, nor has it ever been
reviewed by the DOJ. This may cause problems once the
trading actually begins.
Conclusion
In theory, the CCX is an admirable concept. It can help
reduce GHG emissions from the U.S. immediately, even if the
federal government does not adopt any GHG reduction
measures. However, the CCX has some significant weaknesses
that would need to be resolved in order for the program to be
effective. The monitoring system appears adequate, but it is
unclear how strictly violations will be enforced. Furthermore,
although any reductions in GHG emissions would be beneficial,
the program would need to significantly increase the 4% goal
in order to reach a sustainable level of GHG emissions. Finally,
the internal operations of the CCX seem to be hidden from
the public view. The CCX will have to open its doors to public
scrutiny if it hopes to receive respect from environmentalists
and other critics. Despite a few necessary improvements, the
CCX is an excellent learning tool. Overall, the CCX is more
useful as a learning tool to help pave the way for a more
comprehensive, mandatory emissions trading program.
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BOOK REVIEW
DAVID, GOLIATH AND THE BEACH CLEANING
MACHINE: HOW A SMALL CALIFORNIA TOWN
FOUGHT AN OIL GIANT—AND WON!
Barbara Wolcott
Capital Books; 232 pg. $25.00.

Reviewed By Matt Brown
hat does a lawyer, two years out of law school,
running on a dirty beach on the central coast of
California have to do with a major lawsuit against an
oil giant? That’s the question that Barbara Wolcott answers in
David, Goliath and the Beach Cleaning Machine: How a Small California
Town Fought an Oil Giant—And Won!
Wolcott’s book focuses on the small town of Avila
Beach and how its citizens, upon learning that they were sitting
on top of a large oil plume, fought to have Unocal, the company
that had supported the town for so long, clean up the mess.
At the center of the action are the lawyers and the bureaucrats
who go up against the mighty corporation. The book describes
how the environmental lawyers, the water experts, county and
state politicians, state and county bureaucrats, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, the California Attorney General’s Office
among others gathered their forces and used the full legal and
regulatory arsenal at their disposal to hold Unocal responsible.
Unocal, as it could be imagined, using its mantra of “spend no
dime before its time” fought these gathered forces tooth and
nail not to be held responsible for the oil plume. They used
money, paper work, obfuscation, public relations campaigns,
political pressure and, of course, legal maneuvering all in attempt
to thwart the tiny town’s efforts to force the oil company to
take responsibility. In the end, when all the data was collected
and the all facts surrounding leaks in the company’s oil pipelines
were known, Unocal decided to settle and the lawyers,
bureaucrats, and townspeople got what they wanted—an
environmentally clean and safe Avila Beach.
Or did everyone get what they wanted? In the
background are Avila Beach’s citizens—a collection of the old
and young, the working class and the professional, brought
together in this experience. During the suit their homes lost
value. Because Avila Beach was a “company town” the town
was divided between those that worked and were loyal to
Unocal and those opposed to the environmental hazards that
the company had created. The citizens of Avila Beach also
lived in fear for their health, as conflicting answers were given
as to the possible affects of the pollution. This was only
exacerbated by the arrival of Ed Masry and his sidekick Erin
Brockovich (both of whom Wolcott criticizes harshly) who
played on the fears of the residents of Avila Beach. For those
that called Avila Beach home, the legal triumph was a disaster
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as some lost their businesses and still others lost their homes.
As a result of the settlement, Avila Beach’s downtown had to
be destroyed—a downtown that had been the focal point and
heart of town life. Wolcott highlights this tragedy in the
aftermath of the environmental catastrophe. As the town was
slowly dismantled, the town celebrated its past and it said
goodbye to its landmarks.
In Wolcott’s exploration of Avila Beach’s struggle, the
book provides a great introduction to the ins and outs of
what happens in an environmental lawsuit for the novice lawyer.
In its chronicling Unocal’s tactics, it provides the inexperienced
lawyer with insight into the roadblocks that will be thrown in a
plaintiff ’s way. Wolcott also grimly illustrates the sometimes
harsh costs of winning—the destruction of the heart of a town,
the loss of residents, businesses, and tourists, and in the case of
Avila Beach—a bit of the “funkiness” that the town cherished.
David, Goliath and the Beach Cleaning Machine, may not be as riveting
or compelling a read as A Civil Action, but it stands on its own
as a further exploration of how the law helps us bring about
environmental justice.
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WORLD NEWS BITS
By Roger Phillips

Americas

Africa

Amazon Deforestation Rate Jumps 40%
A group of environmental experts warned that four
infrastructure projects in the Amazon have caused a rush of
deforestation even before building has begun. The report on
the world’s largest tropical forest, by international environmental
experts charged with advising Brazil and rich countries donating
to a program which has channeled $350 million to conserving
the Amazon, came after data in June showed the Amazon
deforestation rate jumped 40 percent last year. Profitable soy
farming is seen as a special threat. Roughly 15 percent of the
Amazon - an area larger than western Europe of continuous
tropical forest that is home to up to 30 percent of the world’s
animal and plant species - has so far been cut down. Annual
Amazon deforestation rose to 9,840 square miles last year, an
area slightly smaller than Haiti, from 7,010 square miles in 2001.
The report recommended that the projects be reconsidered to
take into account long-term environmental impacts and urged
that the wide-scale problem of illegal land deeds in the Amazon
be formalized, which could make monitoring considerably
easier for the government.1

Beetles Save Money For Benin
Two species of beetle are credited with saving the
economy of Benin in West Africa $260 million over 20 years.
Between them, they have overpowered an aquatic super-weed
that kills fish, interferes with boats and changes the ecology of
lakes. Floating mats of the water hyacinth can double in size in
less than two weeks, with the sheer density of its foliage making
fishing and boating all but impossible. In addition, it gives cover
to crocodiles, making it hazardous for local people to collect
water.
Harvesting of the weed has proved futile because it
grows so fast. In the late 1980s, Nigeria spent $1.75 million on
machinery to chew up the plants, without making any impact.
Pesticides are another option, but they pollute the water and
kill other plants. The most effective weapons, though, have
been the weevils Neochetina eichhorniae and N. bruchi, which
eat water hyacinth and nothing else. Setting them onto the weed
can cut coverage by up to 90 per cent. The beasts were first
introduced to Sudan, but have now been deployed across
Africa.3

Ecuadorian Indians Sue Chevron Texaco
Ecuadorian Indians filed a billion dollar lawsuit
demanding that ChevronTexaco clean-up Amazon jungle after
allegedly dumping toxins that destroyed rivers and made people
sick. Lawyers for the Indians filed the suit at the Superior Court
in Lago Agrio, marking the first time the decade-old case will
be heard in Ecuador after years of U.S. court battles over
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs accuse subsidiary Texaco Petroleum Co.
of dumping water laden with oil and metal salts like mercury
and cadmium into Amazon rivers from 1972 to 1992 instead
of reinjecting these waters into the ground. Indians also say
Texaco dumped this oily wastewater into pits that seeped toxins
into the soil, damaging crops, killing farm animals and causing
cancer in local communities, according to a copy of the lawsuit
provided by the plaintiffs. The case was first filed in the United
States in 1993. But the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals
last year affirmed a ruling that Ecuador was a more appropriate
venue. Lawyers, who say they represent 30,000 people, allege
Texaco dumped roughly 18.5 billion gallons of oil-laden water
during operations and demand that the company pay for a
clean-up estimated $1 billion.2

Corporate Misfeasance Blamed For Starvation in Lesotho
As two million people in Lesotho are in need of
international food aid to avoid starvation, a criminal conviction
suggests that irresponsible corporate conduct may contribute
to such development problems. Last May, a Maseru court
sentenced the former head of the Lesotho Highlands Water
Project, Mauspha Sole, to 18 years in prison for bribery. The
court found Sole accepted $3 million from Western companies
in exchange for lucrative contracts on the massive dam scheme
which was meant to provide electricity and water to South
Africa downstream. Lesotho’s hope is that by prosecuting the
multinational construction and engineering conglomerates who
paid the kickbacks will serve as a cautionary tale to Western
contractors.4
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Zambia Adopts Biosafety Measures
Seven months after Zambia rejected genetically
modified foods and banned American transgenic food
donations from entering its territory, the Zambian government
has developed a National Biosafety and Biotechnology Strategy
Plan. The five year plan, from 2003 to 2007, addresses the
proliferation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in
the country. It also sets the pace for Zambia to develop biosafety
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regulations to protect the country’s unique biodiversity. The
new biosafety and biotechnogy framework identifies seven core
program areas. These include environment and biodiversity,
which aims at conserving the genetic diversity of Zambia’s
crops. Other program areas are livestock, fish, and the control
of environmental pollution. The plan also aims at enacting
legislation that will govern the research, development, and
utilization of genetically modified organisms.5

Middle East
Bush Provides Immunity to Oil Industry Work in Iraq
A executive order signed by President Bush more than
two months ago is raising concerns that U.S. oil companies
may have been handed blanket immunity from lawsuits and
criminal prosecution in connection with the sale of Iraqi oil. In
countries such as Nigeria, law suits have been used to prevent
oil companies from destroying the environment and using militias
to quell local protest of corporate practice. However, if the
language of the new executive order is given its plain meaning,
it could completely shield oil companies from liability – even
if it could be proved that they had committed human rights
violations, bribed officials or caused great environmental damage
in teh course of their Iraqi-related business.6

about safety, which have been stoked by a series of accidents
at nuclear plants. TEPCO has turned to thermal power plants
to cover the void left by the loss of nuclear power, which
typically accounts for a little over 40 percent of its power supply.
TEPCO’s reliance on thermal power has also forced a huge
rise in the company’s consumption of fossil fuels.8
(Endnotes)
1
Axel Bugge, Environmentalists Warn of Roads, Dams in Amazon, REUTERS NEWS
S ERVICE available at http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/
20708/story.htm
2
Amy Taxin, Ecuador Indians Sue Texaco Over Polluted Water, REUTERS NEWS SERVICE
available at http://www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/20745/
story.htm.
3
James Randerson, Weevils Save Lakes From Water Hyacinth, NEW SCIENTIST, May
10, 2003, at 10.
4
Jason Beaubien, Bribery Scandal in Lesotho, MORNING EDITION NPR, May 19, 2003
available at 2003 WL 4857618.
5
Singy Hanyona, Zambia Develops Biotechnology Strategy, ENS NEWS SERVICE, April
29, 2003 available at http://ens-news.com/ens/apr2003/2003-04-29-01.asp.
6
Lisa Girion, Immunity For Iraqi Oil Dealings Rasises Alarm; Some Contend Bush’s
Order Grants U.S. Firms a Broad Exemption, A View The Government Rejects,
L.A. TIMES, August 7, 2003 available at WL 2425952.
7
Editorial, Determined Disaster, THE BALTIMORE SUN, June 4, 2003 available at 2003
WL 57161345.
8
Taiga Uranaka, Rising Fuel Costs Bludgeon Tepco Profits, THE JAPAN TIMES, May 21,
2003.

Asia
Three Gorges Dam Resettles 1.3 Million
The 1.4 mile wide Three Gorges dam closed its gates
in an effort to provide electricity and flood control for
communities downstream. The Chinese government will
resettle 1.3 million Chinese to make room for the expected
600 foot deep, 365 mile long lake. However, there remain
significant criticisms of the projects ability to fulfill its purpose.
Some criticize that it will become a slow-moving cesspool
choked with sediment and toxic pollutants and that the rapid
accumulation of silt will limit power production and flood
control and reduce the dam’s lifespan to just 50 years.7
Tokyo Warned of Power Shortage Without Nukes
Japan’s trade and industry minister warned that the
Tokyo area could suffer power shortages if Tokyo Electric
Power Co Inc is unable to restart more nuclear reactors.
TEPCO, the world’s largest stock exchange-listed power utility,
has been forced to successively close down its reactors for
safety checks since last September after it acknowledged
falsifying some data on past inspections. A large obstacle to
TEPCO restarting its reactors is the Japanese public’s concerns
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INTERNATIONAL CALENDAR
SEPTEMBER
2-5 - Brisbane, Australia
Sixth International River Symposium 2003
Web: http://www.riverfestival.com/au/symposium
5-7 - Cancun, Mexico
18th Session of the Global Biodiversity Forum: “Biodiversity,
Trade and Sustainable Development”
Web: http://www.gbf.ch

21-23 - Porquerolles, France
International Workshop on Sustainable Fisheries and
Biodiversity
Web: http://iucn.org/places/medoffice/indexEN.htm
23-30 - New Delhi, India
International Conference on Ecorestoration
Web: http://www.nieindia.org/conferences.htm

6-9 - Muscat, Oman
International Conference on Waste Management & Pest &
Rodent Control
Web: 4748@mctmnet.gov.om

25 - Quebec City, Canada
Certification and World Forestry
Web: http://www.CertificationWatchConference.org

8-17 - Durban, South Africa
The 5th World Parks Congress
http://www.iucn.org/themes/wcpa/wpc2003/

29 SEPT. - 3 OCT. - Moscow, Russian Federation
The Third World Conference on Climate Change
Web: http://www.meteo.ru/wcc2003.econc.htm

9-12 - Delft, the Netherlands
Sixth Water Information Summit
Web: http://www.nieindia.org/conferences.htm
9 - Cozumel, Mexico
High Level Ministerial Dialogue on Trade and Environment—
closed meeting
Web: elendo@semarnat.gob.mx

OCTOBER
2 - Toronto, Canada
Round Table: “An Unwelcomed Dimension of Trade: The Impact
of Alien Invasive Species in North America”
Web: http://www.cec.org

10-11 - Prague
International Conference for a Sustainable Future
Web: http://www.unesco.org/iau

3 - 6 - Sydney, Australia
The 3rd International Conference on Wildland Fire and
International Wildland Fire Summit
Web: http://www.wildlandfire03.com/home.asp

15-18 - St. Michielsgestel, The Netherlands
Information to Support Sustainable Water Management: from
Local to Global Levels
Web: http://www.mtm-conference.nl

4 - 10 - Tsukuba, Japan
Forum on Biodiversity Information: Building Capacity in Asia
and Oceania
E-mail: biodiv@ics-inc.co.jp

17-21 - Pantanal, Brazil
Interlinkages: Water Resources Management in the Pantanal
Wetland
Web: http://www.ias.unu.edu

5 - 8 - Marburg, Germany
International Workshop “Biological Resources and Migration”
Web: http://staff-www.uni0marburg.de/~werner

17-19 - Catania, Italy
Second International Conference on the Impact of Environmental
Factors on Health
Web: http://www.wessex.ac.uk/conferences/2003/healthrisk03/
index.html
21-28 - Quebec, Canada
12th World Forestry Congress
Web: http://www.cfm2003.org
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5 - 9 - Madrid, Spain
XI World Water Congress - Water Resources Management the
21st Century
Web: http://www.cedex.es/iwracongress2003/en/hoja2_en.htm
6 - 10 - Japan
7th Governing Board Meeting of the Global Biodiversity
Information
Web: http://www.gbif.org
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6 - 10 - Vienna, Austria
International Symposium on Application of Gene-based
Technologies for Improving Animal Production and Health in
Developing Countries
Web:http://www.fao.org/ag/age/d3/mtc/symposium2003.html
14 - 15 - Dubrovnik, Croatia
Groups of Experts on Emerald Network and Pan-European
Ecological Network
Web: http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Cooperation/
Environment/
15 - Montreal, Canada
Indigenous Peoples’ Contributions to Understanding Global
Environmental Change
Web: http://www.cine.mcgill.ca
16 - 18 - Montreal, Canada
2003 Open Meeting of the Human Dimensions of Global
Environmental Change Research Community
Web: http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/openmeeting
16 - 17 - Dubrovnik, Croatia
4th International Symposium of the Pan-European Ecological
Network on the theme: “ Marine and Coastal Biological
Diversity and Protected Areas”
Web: http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Cooperation/
Environment/
20 - 24 - Geneva, Switzerland
Second Meeting of the Open-ended Working Group of the
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (OEWG 2)
Web: http://www.basel.int
22 - 24 - Christchurch, New Zealand
Greening the City: Bringing Biodiversity Back into the Urban
Environment
Web: http://www.rnzih.org.nz/pages/conference2003.htm
25 - 28 - Ottawa, Canada
Symposium: Biodiversity and Health, Using and Sustaining
Medicinal Resources
Web: http://www.synapse.net/~tropical
27 - 30 - Kiev, Ukraine
30th Pacem in Maribus. A Year after Johannesburg, Ocean
Governance and Sustainable Development: Ocean and
Coastas - a Glimpse into the Future
Web: http://www.30pim.sevinfo.net
SUMMER/FALL 2003

28 - 29 - Geneva, Switzerland
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment
Web: http://www.wto.org

NOVEMBER
1 - 7 - Bangkok, Thailand
Fourth Session of the Intergovernmental Forum on Chemical
Safety (IFCS)
Web: http://www.ifcs.ch
3 - 7 - Ft. Lauderdale, USA
Invasive Plants in Natural and Managed Systems: Linking
Science and Management and 7th International Conference on
the Ecology and Management of Alien Plant Invasions
Web: http://esa.org/ipinams-emapi7/
3 - 8 - Yokohama, Japan
35th Session of the International Tropical Timber Council
Web: http://www.itto.or.jp
4 - 7 - Rome, Italy
2nd Session of the Intergovernmental Working Group on Plant
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITWG/PGRA)
Web: http://www.fao.org
6 - 9 - Piura, Peru
First International Congress in Dry Forest
Web: http://www.udep.edu/pe/upadi
6 - 8 - Montreal, Canada
International Workshop on Forest Protected Areas
Web: http://www.biodiv.org
10 - 14 - Nairobi, Kenya
15th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol
Web: http://www.unep.org/ozone
10 - 12 - Glasgow, UK
The BCPC International Congress - Crop Science &
Technology 2003
Web: http://www.bcpc.org/Congress2003/About/index.asp
12 - 15 - Florence, Italy
Monitoring and Indicators of Forest Biodiversity in Europe
Web: http://www.efi.fi/events/2003/Monitoring_and_indicators/
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12 - 14 - Paris, France
Global Conference on Oceans, Coasts and Islands: Mobilizing
for Implementation of the Commitments made at the 2002
World Summit on Sustainable Development
Web: http://www.unesco.org
17 - 21 - Geneva, Switzerland
10th Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for PIC
Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in
International Trade
Web: http://www.pic.int
17 - 21 - Rome, Italy
FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on Genetically Modified
Animals (Fish)
Web: http://www.fao.org
23 - 26 - Banff, Canada
Banff Mountain Summit 2003 - Mountains as Water Towers
Web: http:://www.banffcentre.ca
26 - 28 - Rome, Italy
Council of FAO (125th Council)
Web: http://www.fao.org

DECEMBER
1 - 5 - Queenstown, New Zealand
Deep Sea 2003 Conference
Web: http://www.deepsea.govt.nz/index.aspx
1 - 5 - Melbourne, Australia
13th International Symposium on the Biology of Actinomycetes
Web: http://www.conferencestrategy.com.au

1 - 14 - Málaga, Spain
Advanced Seminar on Protected Areas Management and Local
Development in the Mediterranean Context
Web: http://www.uicnmed.org
1 - 4 - Berlin, Germany
Sustainable Use and Conservation of Biological Diversity: A
Challenge for Society
Web: http://www.biodiversity-symposium.de
1 - 12 - Milan, Italy
19th Session of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBI and SBSTAS) UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Web: http://unfccc.int
8 - 12 - Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
The International Conference on the Sustainable Development
of the East Asian Seas: Towards a New Era of Regional
Collaboration and Partnerships
Web: http://way.to/seascongress
10 - 13 - Kathamandu, Nepal
International Conference on Himalayan Biodiversity:
“Conservation of Himalayan Biodiversity for Human Welfare”
Web: http://hirinepal.com
15 - 17 - Chennai, India
Third International Conference on Environment and Health
Web: http://www.yorku.ca/bunchmj/ICEH/

SOURCE: CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY’S CALENDAR
OF EVENTS
WWW.BIODIV.ORG/EVENTS

1 - 4 - Stransbourg, France
22nd Meeting of the Standing Committee to the Convention on
Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats
Web: http://www.coe.int/T/E/Cultural_Cooperation/
Environment/
1 - 12 - Milan, Italy
9th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change plus COP-MOP
Kyoto Protocol (Subject to entry into force)
Web: http://unfccc.int
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